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Abstract 
Populism, an academically contested political theory, has been subject to few thorough 
studies in the New Zealand context. With a history of strong, successful leaders, and 
fervent political rebels, New Zealand provides a useful political context in which the 
theoretical platform for what constitutes populism can be explored. While the current 
pre-eminent model of New Zealand-centric populist leadership is Barry Gustafson’s six 
point framework, this thesis will posit that adopting a multi-methodological approach 
is able to explain the nuances of New Zealand populism more effectively. Traditional 
international approaches to populist theory, such as those of Panizza and Laclau, are 
introduced to provide context on the wider literature on populism. In a challenge to 
Gustafson’s model, which closely matches the definitions of Panizza and Laclau, the 
social choice theorems of Riker’s heresthetics are introduced to provide a counter-
explanation for populist leadership. The study applies the theories of traditional 
populism and heresthetics to three case studies of New Zealand leaders; John A. Lee, 
Winston Peters, and Richard Seddon. Through application of Gustafson’s model to 
these leaders, we see that his criteria are only significantly met in the cases of Lee and 
Peters, while the criteria are only partially met in the case of Seddon.  In regards to 
Seddon, Riker’s heresthetics and the theorems of Panizza and Laclau equally explain his 
populism. After classifying the populism of each case study, an attempt is made to 
explain why each selected leader was drawn to a particular style of populism, and it is 
posited that Renshon’s construct of relatedness, a dimension of his over-arching theory 
of character, can provide a qualitative answer to this question. These case studies 
demonstrate that populist leadership in New Zealand needs to be seen as a continuum, 
in which populist leaders vary in the degree to which they fit within particular 
theoretical classifications, and that a multi-methodological approach is necessary to 
explain the nuances of each case. The study posits that this approach will aid further 
study, particularly when analysing modern leaders that employ a milder variant of 
populism. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
Any attempt to explore populist leadership in New Zealand should address relevant 
theoretical elements, and analyse appropriately specific case studies. This examination 
of populism in the New Zealand context will firstly introduce and review theories 
relevant to populist leadership, before embarking on a detailed analysis of three 
selected New Zealand case studies, in which theoretical frameworks are applied to test 
their validity, producing findings that represent a more nuanced understanding of 
populism in New Zealand than the extant literature. The study will therefore offer new 
theoretical tools for use in future studies of populism phenomena. 
Theoretical description and analysis is contained in chapter 2, where the relevant 
literature on populism is discussed.  Four separate theoretical schools will be 
introduced: those of European political theorists Laclau and Panizza; followed by Barry 
Gustafson’s dominant domestic model of populism; and the game-theory driven 
approach of William Riker. The internationally orthodox conceptions of populism are 
presented first, ostensibly to give the study a broad definition and understanding of 
populism, while also providing the first theoretical instrument to be later applied to the 
case studies. Following this, the pre-eminent model of populist leadership in New 
Zealand, Barry Gustafson’s six-point framework, is presented, and its centrality to this 
study is explained. Due to the limitations of the Gustafson model the strategic 
approach of Riker’s heresthetics is introduced as a different prism for analysing aspects 
of populist leadership. While the three theoretical frameworks introduced at this stage 
attempt to categorise the style of populism employed by a leader, one crucial 
dimension of Renshon’s character formulation is brought into the study to help explain 
why each leader is drawn, consciously or unconsciously, to either traditional populism 
or the heresthetic approach. This qualitative explanation adds a unique dimension to 
this study. Whereas previous studies of populist leadership in New Zealand have 
sought to categorise populists, this study also attempts to explain why each populist 
leader analysed made the political decisions that defined their particular style of 
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populism. Following the literature review, the preceding theories are applied in the 
following three chapters to three non-controversial selections of populist New Zealand 
politicians - Labour rebel John A. Lee (chapter 3), New Zealand First leader Winston 
Peters (chapter 4), and New Zealand’s most acclaimed  Premier, Richard Seddon 
(chapter 5). Following the case studies, in chapter 6, further analytical insights drawn 
from one dimension of Renshon’s character-focused theory help qualitatively explain 
each of the populist variants in this study. Finally, in the concluding chapter 7 the major 
findings of this study will be discussed in terms of both their theoretical contribution to 
the understanding of populism in the New Zealand context and their utility for future 
research directions into populism. 
What follows below is an introduction of the crucial concepts used in this study, 
incorporating both populism and Renshon’s depiction of character, as well as 
methodological issues associated with case study selection and this study’s set of 
driving hypotheses.   
Traditional Definition of Populism  
The study uses the traditional populism theories of Ernesto Laclau and Francisco 
Panizza to provide a theoretical tool for the analysis of leaders, particularly those who 
are consistently anti-establishment in their politics. The theorems were selected due to 
their clear views on populism as a concept. Much of the literature surrounding 
populism focused on particular populist leaders, selected regions (mostly South 
America), political parties, or institutional milieus. Laclau and Panizza offer similar, but 
subtly different approaches to defining populism as both a theory and a concept. Their 
theories are particularly useful because they are removed from contexts, whether 
individual or situational, and therefore are not weighed down by the ideological and 
methodological baggage of other specific international approaches. In the literature 
review a detailed analysis will show that Panizza sees populism as an ‘anti-status quo’ 
discourse, established through a process of a populist leader naming a ‘people’ and an 
‘other’. Laclau, however, views populism as a political category, although similarly 
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formed by dividing society into in- and out- groups, with the rise of a populist leader 
crucial in defining the ‘political logic’ that constitutes populism. Each case study in this 
study will be analysed through the lens of Panizza and Laclau’s traditional populism, in 
order to test the hypothesis that we need to view populist leadership in New Zealand 
as a continuum, and that we should, accordingly, expect leaders to vary from a purely 
populist approach to a milder form of strategic populism. This analysis will 
demonstrate that Peters and Lee match these traditional approaches to pure populism, 
while Seddon can be viewed more as a hybrid populist leader: a strategic leader who 
was willing to compromise, but one also grounded in the language and heritage of 
populism. 
Gustafson’s Model 
The current pre-eminent model of New Zealand populist leadership is Barry 
Gustafson’s six-point framework, as found in Raymond Miller and Michael Mintrom’s 
Political Leadership in New Zealand. As such, this model is the logical starting point for 
a study related to populist leaders in New Zealand. The model establishes six defining 
points that Gustafson claims need to be met for a leader to be labelled populist. 
Gustafson’s views of the three case study leaders are canvassed fully in the literature 
review. Particular application of Gustafson’s model to each leader occurs in each 
individual case study chapter, and will empirically demonstrate the strength of the 
model in explaining variants of populism. This study hypothesizes that while 
Gustafson’s model is useful and accurate, particularly for defining leaders who more 
closely embody the traditional populist ideal, it has limitations in that it does not 
effectively encapsulate populist leaders who employ a milder, more subtle variant of 
populism. The rigidity of the model when faced with this variant of populist leader is 
the crucial limitation of Gustafson’s theory, and the empirical evidence found in the 
case study chapters demonstrates that a more nuanced model is necessary to be able 
to explain variations in the form that populist leadership  adopts. This is clearest after 
the application of the model to Richard Seddon. Political leaders such as Seddon are 
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more willing to compromise, and are more electorally and legislatively successful than 
traditional populists, particularly once in government. These leaders embrace a 
strategic approach to political positioning, and the study hypothesizes that a new 
theoretical framework, outside of traditional populist approaches, needs to be applied 
to the case studies to better understand the role of strategy in populist leadership.  
Additional Insights – Heresthetics 
In chapter 2, the study identifies a political theory that can be effectively used to 
analyze the strategy of populist leaders. Through a reading of Seddon’s political career, 
it is evident that this populist leader was also adept at political positioning, deft 
strategy, and successful compromise and horse trading. William Riker’s theory of 
heresthetics, identified initially in research for this study in the excellent work done by 
Jack Nagel on Richard Seddon, was selected due to its clear theoretical structure, and 
the wide applicability of its framework to successful, popular leaders. Heresthetics, at 
its core, is concerned with the strategy-value of sentences, and theorises that a leader 
can manipulate their political environment. It also states that leaders can destabilise 
their political opponents, while restricting their opponent’s policy choices; and argues 
that heresthetic leaders can achieve legislative successes without having to change the 
previously-held political positions of the electorate. In the literature review Riker’s 
theorems are explained in detail, a conceptual model for heresthetical action provided 
by Kenneth Shepsle is also discussed, and various scholarly critiques of the theory are 
canvassed. The study hypothesises that Seddon, due to his strategic mastery of 
political institutions and electoral alliances throughout his time in power, will most 
strongly resemble Riker’s heresthetician, while Peters and Lee will more closely 
resemble more traditional populist theory, as well as Gustafson’s model. Heresthetic 
theory will be applied to empirical evidence from each case study to test these 
hypotheses, and will be contrasted with historical examples of the leader making 
decisions that signal a traditional populist approach. 
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Qualitative Explanation – Renshon and Character 
The final theorem introduced in the literature review is to focus on one aspect of 
Stanley A. Renshon’s three foundations of character: namely, the domain of 
relatedness, or how an individual relates to others. This was introduced because of a 
need in this study to provide an explanation that attempts to qualitatively depict each 
leader’s particular expression of populism, rather than categorising or describing the 
career of a leader, which is the main function of the previous theories. This means that 
the study has a theoretical tool that can provide a ‘why’ answer in relation to differing 
types of populist leaders, rather than just ‘what’ type of populist they are. Through the 
application of this theory to the case studies, qualitative explanations can then be 
posited, rather than just quantitative descriptions. Renshon’s theory was chosen 
because his model is broad in scope, and can be separated into sections that are of 
varying use, enabling the study to focus on the most relevant theoretical tool to 
provide reasons that explain differences in populist styles. Renshon’s model was 
designed to be applied to U.S presidential candidates - leaders who are seeking high 
office, and looking for broad popular support. It was deemed that this was a good fit, 
also, in the New Zealand setting, as domestic leaders also are driven by the same 
psychological processes irrespective of institutional or cultural differences between the 
United States and New Zealand-styled democracy. Renshon applied his model 
effectively to his case studies in The Psychological Assessment of Presidential 
Candidates, the source book for his theory, by analysing the leader’s careers and 
decisions through the scope of their career. This study’s focus on political careers and 
the decisions made by leaders further reinforces the validity of selecting Renshon’s 
domain of relatedness for this study. 
While Renshon’s theory is centred on his three ‘foundations of character’ - ambition, 
character integrity and relatedness - only relatedness will be applied in the subsequent 
case studies. This is because it is considered that differences in relatedness – how each 
subject’s patterns of ‘relatedness’ facilitated or hampered their populist causes and 
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leadership of them – are a crucial explanatory variable. A leader’s capacity to relate to 
others and their stance in relationships is found to be crucial for predicting populist 
style. The more a leader is able to move towards people naturally, the more likely it is 
that the leader will be able to employ successful heresthetics, compromise, and cajole. 
Anti-establishment stances are fed by a political character defined by moving away or 
against people. The theorised milder variant of populism is only possible if the leader is 
effective at maintaining and entering into strategically useful close relationships. 
Further study, with a wider group of case studies, may demonstrate that relatedness is 
also a predetermination for the success of a populist leader: legislatively, electorally, 
and particularly in terms of the ability to reach their political system’s highest elected 
office. The ability to be flexible and willing to compromise, and to sacrifice some rigid 
character integrity stances, also appears to be a crucial variable for successful 
heresthetics. 
Case Study Chapters – Subject, Selection and Justification 
Following the literature review, the aforementioned case studies are analysed in detail. 
These are comprised of an abbreviated political biography on each leader, and sections 
that apply the two competing theoretical schools, populism and heresthetics, testing 
their validity and usefulness in explaining each leader. This is done by identifying 
practical examples of decisions made by the leader that indicates either a populist or a 
heresthetic disposition. The theoretical hypothesis regarding where each leader fits on 
the populist continuum is rigorously tested by the identification of counter-examples 
that seek to disprove these assumptions. Following the presentation of this empirical 
evidence, as mentioned previously, the Gustafson model is applied to each case study, 
to test its validity, and to determine how it is linked to the relative strength of 
traditional populism or heresthetics found in each leader’s career. Concluding remarks 
are then presented, summarising the historical information and making the theoretical 
analysis. 
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Selection of the leaders to analyse in this study was done through a deliberate method, 
in which options were narrowed down to a small group of leaders of which something 
important regarding populism in New Zealand could be gleaned. An initial list was 
compiled from the leaders deemed to be populists by Barry Gustafson, as part of his 
study into populist leadership in New Zealand. The first leader to be chosen for the 
study, and the one who was the closest to being self-selecting, was Winston Peters. 
Peters was chosen for three reasons. Firstly, his name is often the first which comes to 
mind for many when positing a question about populism in New Zealand, and his role 
in the public consciousness has spanned decades, leaving his style of politics clear in 
the minds of followers of politics. Secondly, as both a rebel MP in a major party, and 
the leader of a political vehicle that embodied his populism, two differing political 
spheres are available in his career in which to test theoretical assumptions. Thirdly, 
Peters has served as both a popular Opposition MP, and as a Minister in both Labour 
and National governments, providing the study with further historical insights into his 
natural dispositions.  
John A. Lee was selected as an ideological counter-weight to Peters, similarly a strong 
orator, a rebel within his own party, and unwilling to compromise, but from the left, as 
a long-time socialist and member of the labour movement. Lee also fell out with party 
leadership, and eventually formed his own party, moulded in his image, in a similar 
fashion to Peters. Lee, however, was more strongly associated with political ideology, 
namely socialism, than Peters, whose brand of independence and nationalism was not 
as clear and thoroughly defined. This point makes Lee a useful contrast to Peters, when 
examining subtle differences in traditional populist leaders. 
The decision to select Richard Seddon for this study stemmed from three factors. 
Firstly, Seddon was a highly successful political leader, arguably the most successful 
leader identified as a populist by Gustafson. Therefore, an analysis that would attempt 
to explain the reasons for the success of his populism was desirable.  Secondly, as 
Premier, Seddon wielded more power than individuals selected in the other case 
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studies, and an examination of the behaviour of a populist Prime Minister was deemed 
to be useful to add a further layer of depth to the study. Thirdly, the flexibility and 
willingness to compromise that is evident in Seddon’s career was in stark contrast to 
the conduct of Peters and Lee. This factor, allied with the decision to employ Riker’s 
theorems and Renshon’s foundations of character in the study in an attempt to explain 
this phenomenon, meant that this case study could be used as an empirical counter-
point to traditional populism. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Before the application of theories to the case studies, the study is grounded in a 
hypothesis, based on a brief reading of the careers of each leader. This hypothesis is 
multi-faceted, and attempts to predict the results of the application of all four 
theoretical frameworks; Laclau and Panizza, Gustafson, Riker and Renshon. Firstly, it is 
hypothesised that the study will find notable differences between the case studies, in 
how each subject’s populism can be categorised. This divergence is expected to be 
clearest when comparing Seddon to Peters and Lee. Peters and Lee appear to more 
closely fit the six criteria in Gustafson’s model, and also employ a brand of populism 
that, more actively than Seddon, is anti-establishment in the style of Panizza and 
Laclau. Peters and Lee are predicted to be close examples of ‘pure’ populism. 
Differences between the two are expected to be notable, due to their ideological 
placement. Seddon, however, as a product of his early life and career, is still grounded 
in the populism of his time, and examples of active defining of a ‘people’ and an ‘other’ 
are also evident in his case. It is hypothesised that what will separate Seddon is the 
strategic mastery he held over the political and institutional milieu; his ability and 
willingness to employ heresthetics, his focus on the strategy-value of decisions, and his 
readiness to compromise and make deals, ultimately lead to his political success and 
maintenance of power. It is expected that examples of Lee and Peters employing 
successful heresthetics will be limited. It is also hypothesised that Renshon’s character 
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domain of relatedness can provide a qualitative explanation about why each leader is 
drawn towards their style of populism, consciously or unconsciously. 
The concluding chapter of this study will draw together the major findings drawn from 
the case studies to provide a more nuanced understanding of populist behaviour in the 
New Zealand context as well as point to future research directions which can further 
enhance understanding of populism and populist leadership phenomena. 
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Chapter Two - Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks 
In order to better explain the nature of New Zealand populism, this study is grounded 
in theoretical frameworks that will be used to analyze the leadership case studies. In 
this chapter, the four key frameworks of populism, Barry Gustafson’s model of populist 
leadership, heresthetics and Renshon’s character theorems, and the literature 
associated with them, will be presented and reviewed.  
The first theoretical framework consists of two differing approaches that seek to 
explain popular leadership using orthodox populist theory, which are drawn from 
leading internationalist theorists. Following that, the current preeminent model of New 
Zealand populism, Barry Gustafson’s six point model of populist leadership, will be 
discussed. This model will be applied to each case study; but it is posited that, because 
of flaws in the model, a revised and enhanced model can better explain New Zealand 
populism. In its current form, Gustafson’s model does not encapsulate some of the 
leaders it deems to be populist, and a more flexible approach is necessary in order to 
provide a more inclusive approach to future study of the field. 
The third concept introduced is the social choice-based paradigm of William Riker’s 
heresthetics, to provide an alternative explanation. Finally, the psychological approach 
of Stanley Renshon’s three foundations of character is identified as a method to assess 
a leader’s personal qualities and explain qualitative differences in their leadership 
posture.  
Populism 
In Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, Francisco Panizza presents a symptomatic 
reading of populism that acknowledges that the analytical core of populism is the 
constitution of the people as a political actor. Panizza’s approach draws both from 
empirical definitions of populism that consist of a series of characteristics, and 
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historical definitions that focus on periods of history where populism has been 
politically salient.1 
Populism, under this paradigm, is what Panizza terms an ‘anti-status quo discourse’ 
between the ‘people’ and the ‘other’. This discourse, as its name suggests, has at its 
heart a reaction against authority and predetermined structure. Here, populism is a 
mode of identification, in which the ‘people’ and the ‘other’ are established through a 
process of naming by populist forces, a period of antagonism in which sides attempt to 
define each other as the ‘other’. Until this process occurs, often provoked by a 
charismatic leader, who exactly the ‘people’ and the ‘other’ are is unclear.2 
Panizza describes the process of naming the ‘people’ as being based on perception and 
labelling, stating that differing actors view the people as an entity as “both lewd and 
virtuous, both irrational and an embodiment of the nation’s true values, both a threat 
to democracy and the holders of sovereignty”.3 The concept of the ‘people’ depends 
both on a sense of internal homogeneity and on a sense of external homogeneity, 
against which an identity can be formed. This reactive process produces the identity 
that runs counter to the people, the ‘other’. Panizza states that this identity is as 
diverse as the identity of the people, and can range from plutocrats, oligarchs and 
landed elites to welfare recipients, ethnic minorities and immigrants. The ‘other’ is 
constantly redefined through populist language and the moves of a populist leader, 
and Panizza notes that this is most starkly noticeable when a populist campaigner 
becomes part of the governing structure themselves.4 
Peter Worsley identifies the concept of populism as a syndrome, rather than as an 
ideology. Ernesto Laclau elaborates on this in On Populist Reason, stating that Worsley 
sees populism as a ‘dimension of politics’, which can appear in different political 
                                                          
1
 Francisco Panizza, Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, in Francisco Panizza (ed.), Populism and the 
Mirror of Democracy, London, 2005, p. 3 
2
 Panizza, pp. 3-4 
3
 Panizza, p. 16 
4
 Panizza, pp. 16-18 
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movements.5 Laclau agrees with Worsley’s general direction, stating that it is 
impossible to define populism in a universal, normative fashion, and therefore it is 
difficult to identify the effects of populism on political movements.6  
Ernesto Laclau presents a similar view of populism to that of Panizza, stating that 
“populism requires the dichotomist division of society into two camps - one presenting 
itself as a part which claims to be the whole; and that this dichotomy involves the 
antagonistic division of the social field”.7 This concept also involves an active division, a 
process of naming in the language of Panizza, producing the in and out groups 
necessary for a populist movement to flourish.  
Laclau identifies two important aspects of populism, the populist symbol and the 
populist leader. Laclau writes that while populist symbols are often dismissed as 
‘imprecise’ or ‘vague’, it is not because of ideological or political underdevelopment of 
these symbols; rather it is due to the fact that their creation takes place on what he 
terms ‘radically heterogeneous social terrain’.8 Laclau explains that the heterogeneity 
of a populist camp means that a symbol produced by such a movement, such as a flag 
or song, cannot be reduced to just what it expresses, rather that the process of its 
creation is as important.9 Laclau refers to the populist leader as a form of popular 
symbol or identity who actively, rather than passively, constitutes an expression of 
populism, and claims that the rise and clear identification of such a leader is often the 
decisive moment in establishing the unity of a populist logic. The leader is not neutral 
or transparent; rather, they are actively part of the populism and the ‘people’ 
themselves.10 
There are two important factors that make up Laclau’s theory of populism: logic and 
naming. His first assertion is that populism is not a movement in the mould of Panizza’s 
                                                          
5
 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, New York, 2005, p. 13 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Laclau, p. 83 
8
 Laclau, pp. 98-99 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
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populism; it is what he terms a ‘political logic’.11 Political logic derives from the theory 
of social logic, which Laclau describes as a “rarefied system of statements – that is to 
say, a system of rules drawing a horizon within which some objects are represented 
while others are excluded”.12 Laclau states that political logic differs from social logic in 
that it does not merely follow rules, but occurs out of social demands and is inherent to 
any process of social change. Crucially, marking populism as a constructed 
phenomenon, it involves the formation of internal frontiers and the identification of an 
institutionalized ‘other’.13 
Further reinforcing the concept of populist constructivism, Laclau states that 
establishing populist in and out groups involves an active form of conscious naming by 
either the leader or the leadership of a populist vehicle, in a process which does not 
express a previously given unity of the group.14 The effect of this is that the populist 
logic is only named in a nominal fashion, and is not grounded in any one sector of 
society, unlike the traditional movements of left and right.15 Laclau explains that this 
means that “the limits between the demands it is going to embrace and those it is 
going to exclude will be blurred, and subjected to permanent challenge. Social reality is 
to a large extent heterogeneous and fluctuating. This means that the language of 
populist discourse is always going to be imprecise and fluctuating”.16  
According to Laclau, there are obstacles and limits to the construction of the concept 
of the ‘people’, and the complex process can fail to achieve its aims.17 Laclau states 
that  “political identities are the result of the articulation of the opposed logics of 
equivalence and difference, and the mere fact that the balance between these logics is 
broken by one of the two poles prevailing beyond a certain point over the other, is 
enough to cause the ‘people’ as a political actor to disintegrate. If social heterogeneity 
                                                          
11
 Laclau, p. 117 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Laclau, p. 200 
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(difference) prevails, there is no possibility for establishing an equivalential chain in the 
first place. Total equivalence, on the other hand, would collapse into mere identity, a 
homogenous mass, making the emergence of the ‘people’ as a collective actor 
impossible”.18 
Laclau concludes by claiming that the ‘people’ is a political category; it is neither a 
group, nor part of the traditional social structure.19 The ‘people’ is a construction, 
formed from a plurality of heterogeneous single parts, a social demand that becomes 
whole through what Laclau describes as an asymmetry with the community as a whole 
and the plebs, who view themselves as the community’s true voice.20   
Gustafson’s Model of New Zealand Populism 
Gustafson writes that ‘Vox Populi’, the voice of the people, is crucial in all democratic 
and non-democratic societies. Governments look to form support based on defining 
group identity and shared interest that contrasts with those appealed to by ‘others’.21 
This can be seen as a populist approach, but can also be seen in traditional political 
approaches. 
A crucial aspect of populism is the vagaries of the concept. In his Populist Roots of 
Political Leadership in New Zealand, Gustafson identifies two methods of defining 
populism and the populist. The first definition describes a political leader or movement 
that can mobilise broad popular support. Gustafson considers this to be a loose 
definition, while his second definition is ‘stricter’ and delves deeper into the crux of the 
prism posited in this thesis,22 providing a method to filter through the psychological 
and character-based traits of the analysed New Zealand leaders. The definition is as 
follows: populist movements are ‘movements of protest against governments or 
                                                          
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Laclau, p. 224  
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Barry Gustafson, Populist roots of political leadership in New Zealand, in Raymond Miller and Michael 
Mintrom (eds.), Political Leadership in New Zealand, Auckland University Press, 2006, p. 51 
22
 Ibid. 
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parties seen as entrenched defenders of the existing political, economic and social 
order’.23 
Gustafson breaks down the core values of these movements, stating that the ‘essence’ 
of populism is a belief in the collective judgement of the ‘ordinary’ or ‘mainstream’ 
citizen, in contrast to the elites that make up powerful institutions, and minority 
interests that threaten the homogeneity and status of the majority or plurality 
‘common man’.24 A populist politician must communicate the ‘people’s interests’ 
against those of the political, academic and business elite, and often come to embody 
the movement itself, as the quintessential ordinary person made good, a first among 
equals.25 
Gustafson and the ‘Populist Leader’ – The Theoretical Model 
Gustafson’s definition of a populist leader in a democratic system encompasses those 
leaders who demonstrate a set of characteristics first sighted in modern times in the 
People’s Party in late 19th century rural America. The model is as follows: 
1. The leader claims to know what ‘ordinary’ people desire and believe, in contrast to 
corrupted and ignorant political parties and leaders of the established elite. 
2. The leader draws their support from the marginalised and out-of-power, particularly 
during periods of recession and rapid change. 
3. The leader is anti-elitist, and sees hidden agendas behind decisions that affect 
business and government, that are detrimental to the ‘silent majority’. 
4. The leader is nationalistic, inward looking and opposed to foreign ‘meddling’ or 
investment. This can sometimes be ethnocentric and racist. Immigration is a common 
issue in which a ‘them-us’ divide is forged. 
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5. The leader uses a simplified nostalgia to hark back to a ‘Golden Age’ of prosperity 
and security. 
6. The leader is the operational leader of the movement, section or party but comes to 
embody it publically.26 
These characteristics are summed up by Gustafson as involving a ‘deep sense of 
injustice’,27 and being grounded in a romantic rather than rational reaction to the 
decay of society through social and cultural change, and the influence of organised 
‘elite’ special interests.28 
Gustafson’s Views on Populist Leaders in New Zealand  
Gustafson directly considers the three leaders that provide the case studies for this 
thesis. 
Richard Seddon is described by Gustafson as claiming to understand and represent the 
relative have-nots in a society devastated by depressions, and as the foe of urban 
bankers, businessmen and large landowners. He offered strong leadership towards a 
‘fair society’.29 
According to Gustafson, John A. Lee practised the ‘politics of victimhood’, through 
sparkling oratory, novels and essays. A decorated wounded veteran and avowed 
socialist, Lee criticised bankers and trade union officials alike, and became a rebel 
within the party caucus. Gustafson states that Lee viciously attacked his colleagues, 
particularly his enemy Labour Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage, for not living up 
to their socialist principles through policy that would help the working man. Lee was 
also socially liberal for his time, unafraid to talk of sex and moral issues, and a 
supporter of aspects of women’s rights. He formed the Democratic Soldier Labour 
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Party, which, despite a flurry of initial activity, became a one man band after 
unsuccessful nationwide campaigns.30  
Gustafson describes Winston Peters as a ‘charming and courageous, if egocentric, 
politician who over a long period built his personal reputation, against the political, 
bureaucratic, business, financial and intellectual elite’.31 He claims that Peters viewed 
the sale of NZ assets to foreign interests as a threat to national sovereignty, and 
launched his New Zealand First party with populist rhetoric such as ‘the relegated, 
denigrated and forgotten people will hold politicians to account and will restore honest 
government in the interests of all to New Zealand’.32 Peters launched into personal 
crusades against what he saw as corruption, most notably the Winebox inquiry, which 
left Peters personally out of pocket. Peters has spoken on immigration, law and order, 
and race relations as prominent populist issues, and often ran successful election 
campaigns, to large success for a minor party leader, on these issues.33 Peters has often 
been ahead of the curve with populist issues, with major parties co- opting them in an 
attempt to tap into Peters’ constituency and rob him of support. Gustafson writes of 
Peters’ excellent platform speaking and television performance as useful tools in 
communicating his clear populist message to the public. Peters has retained popularity 
with certain groups for the last 20 years, particularly the elderly, in his role as ‘voice for 
the voiceless’.34 
Heresthetics 
Renowned theorist and political scientist William H. Riker termed the concept of 
heresthetics through his work on social choice theory and equilibrium, creating an 
important new tool in the discourses of leadership and electoral analysis. The word 
itself comes from the root of an Ancient Greek word, haresis, meaning ‘the act of 
choosing’.  
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Riker writes in The Art of Political Manipulation that his concept is related to rhetoric, 
the art of verbal persuasion, but differs on three key points. First there is more 
‘eloquence and elegance’ involved in heresthetics, whereas rhetoric is more of a blunt 
tool used to convey a constant view.35  Second, Riker argues that political victors can 
succeed using heresthetics without needing the persuasive quality of rhetoric; rather, 
they win because they have constructed a situation for themselves so that other 
people will want to join them, either without realising, or feeling forced to do so 
through circumstance.36 Finally, unlike rhetoric, heresthetics must be done from some 
point of political influence or strategic placement, making practice more difficult for 
the novice than rhetoric, as a leadership position of some sort must be attained first.37  
Riker places heresthetic amongst the traditional liberal arts of language, which men 
use to control their surroundings, and states that if his discovery had been identified in 
the Greek age, it would have been as common and as teachable as the other arts. 
According to Riker, the arts of language are as follows: logic, which is concerned with 
the truth-value of sentences; grammar, which is concerned with the communication-
value of sentences; rhetoric, which is concerned with the persuasion-value of 
sentences; and finally, as a new addition to the traditional arts, heresthetic, which is 
concerned with the strategy-value of sentences.38 This focus on strategy indicates why 
heresthetics is a valid tool for the analysis of politics, where strategy is of paramount 
importance for the acquisition and maintenance of power. 
Riker came to this realisation of a new art of language through social choice theory, 
which explains how the preferences of individual members of a group are 
amalgamated into a decision for the group as a whole. The theory came before the art, 
unlike the original three arts of language, and strategic manipulation played a large 
part in this process, in what is termed game theory.39 Riker explains that theorists 
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began to group together empirical applications of the strategic theory, and that he 
could see that these events and decisions could be compiled in the same way that the 
traditional arts of language could be compiled.40 A new tool for understanding this 
intersection of theory was necessary, and this process led to the labelling of 
heresthetics as a theoretical tool.41  
Kenneth Shepsle writes in Losers in Politics that pre-heresthetics, politics was viewed as 
an equilibrium, in which events were the equilibria of a process, and the result, a 
winning candidate or policy, was the equilibrium. Shepsle states that Riker’s work on 
social choice theory, which gave way to heresthetics, changed this; he claims that his 
results showed that in most situations equilibrium did not exist, and therefore 
equilibrium theory was fundamentally flawed.42 
Shepsle elaborates that in a political process, such as an election or the attempted 
passage of legislation, a winner can be named, but the winner was not the equilibrium 
(the middle point) of a constant underlying process. Rather, a given winner was a 
provisional choice that could be amended at the next possible opportunity.43 Shepsle’s 
point that disequilibrium is the human condition of politics is crucial in understanding 
the concept of heresthetics.44 In an interview with William Riker, Shepsle uncovers 
insights into the rationalisation of heresthetic theory.  Riker states that the natural 
harmony present in classical economics is absent in politics, explaining the lack of 
equilibrium.45 Riker critiques the attempts by theorists to explain outcomes through 
rigid models, contrasting these attempts with the strategic flexibility of heresthetic 
analysis. Riker states that “theoretical models are insufficiently attentive to the process 
by which outcomes result, whether with an equilibrium or not. Models often have fixed 
and given points and statements – who fixes the models? Who gives the points? The 
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manoeuvring of political entrepreneurs with respect to models cannot always be taken 
as fixed and part of the background. Models cannot always explain this. Points of the 
theoretical chain aren’t fixed in politics”.46 
Shepsle presents a common theoretical model used to explain outcomes, and explains 
why it is flawed when viewing it through the context of heresthetic manoeuvring. The 
model used is mapped out as: N (agents) + A (actions) + U (utility functions) + G 
(mapping) = Final Outcomes.47 The comfortable equilibrium and re-equilibrium of 
winners and losers is severely tested and shown to be false when the strategy-value of 
actors implementing heresthetics is apparent.48 
Shepsle presents the following points to demonstrate this: 
- Politicians seek to influence who the relevant set of agents is – changing 
the set (N) 
Example: A city manager who arranged a gerrymander of the city council districts to 
ensure that the set N of city councillors would possess a partisan majority favourable 
to keeping her in her job.49 
- Politicians invent new actions – the set (A) is not fixed 
Example: US Speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas Reed, redefined the 
manner in which quorums were counted – changing it so the minority tactic of not 
voting could not stop a bill – declaring it within the Speaker’s power to count members 
as “present and counting toward a quorum”.50 
- Politicians frame the evaluation of outcomes by others in order to improve 
the chances of the ones they most desire – they seek to change agent 
preferences – utility functions - (U) 
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Example: US Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D-Washington) made the issue of moving 
nerve gas from Guam across his state into an instance of the executive failing to 
consult the Senate on a matter of foreign policy, and gained the few decision votes 
needed to pass his bill that banned such a move.51 
- Politicians invent political processes to give favour to their outcomes – (G) 
Example: Caltech professors revising agendas of voting and voting procedures in order 
to produce the result of approving their purchase of a fleet of planes for their flying 
club.52  
Shepsle concludes his overview section on heresthetics by summarising the concept 
with an important distinction: that heresthetics is the art politicians use when they 
change political outcomes without changing people’s underlying preferences.53  He 
explains that “clever politicians do not take the political world as they find it. If that 
world possesses no conventional equilibrium, they engage in search behaviour to find a 
preferred outcome that can defeat the status quo. If that world does possess 
equilibrium, then by definition there is nothing within the conventional framework to 
be done. But this does not prevent a politician from finding some new way to 
accomplish what is blocked by existing ways of doing things”.54 
Shepsle states that Riker’s theory is utilised by both the winners and losers of politics, 
most notably incumbents and opposition. Political winners or incumbents engage in 
what Shepsle terms heresthetical defence, engaging in acts of ‘creative destruction’ 
which are moves that deny their opponents the ability to be able to turn their fortunes 
around.55 Riker himself gives credence to this concept, stating that even after winning, 
politicians want to continue to win, and therefore they “may be found continually 
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poking and pushing the world to get the result they want”.56 In order to display a 
working example of this, Shepsle presents the case study of the early nineteenth 
century Jefferson-Jackson coalition in the United States playing heresthetical defence 
from a winning position.57 The coalition won six straight presidential elections, secured 
the winning side of the agrarian expansion/commercial development issue, and 
focussed on profitable party-building pursuits. The Opposition only regained 
momentum under the unified Whig banner and by naming popular military generals as 
candidates.58  
This case study demonstrated that incumbents may need only to govern competently, 
as the opposition is often fractured, looking for new salient issues and undergoing 
leadership ructions. The one winning heresthetical issue that could have been used by 
the opposition, slavery, was not effectively used by the opposition until half a century 
later, which had the effect of splitting the Democratic Party in half.59 Shepsle writes 
that incumbents may be protected by electoral arrangements, and that it is difficult for 
the opposition to introduce new issues if they are not salient in the public mind. 
Shepsle states that opposition parties can add new issues to their platform in order to 
be successful, or engage in further splintering of the political party system to achieve 
proportionate support from a section of the community.60  
Shepsle’s political losers engage in what he defines as ‘heresthetical offense’ when 
reacting to heresthetic disequilibrium; this involves always being proactive, either by 
grinding out political ground by taking a stance issue by issue, or by choosing to go for 
a large gain that changes the political dimensions, in what Shepsle terms a ‘Hail Mary 
pass’.61 In reaction to these classifications of winners and losers inside his theory, Riker 
states that, “for a person who expects to lose on some decision, the fundamental 
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heresthetical device is to divide the majority with a new alternative, one that he 
prefers to the alternative previously expected to win. If successful, this manoeuvre 
produces a new majority composed of the old majority and the portion of the old 
majority that likes the new alternative better. Of course, it takes artistic creativity of 
the highest order to invent precisely the right kind of new alternative”.62  
Riker further elaborates that “defeat is the mother of all invention. In this sense it is 
losers who provide a political dynamic in public life; innovating and strategising to 
become winners on the one hand, and energizing the incumbent winners to anticipate 
and try to deflect the losers’ manoeuvres on the other”.63 Three aspects are crucial in 
understanding the role and options available to political losers; they must repackage 
the issues, break up coalitions by making the issue multidimensional, and invent new 
dimensions for political conflict to take place. These are most effective when the loser 
engages in areas in which the incumbent is unprepared, or surprised by a new stance 
that runs counter to the loser’s previous position.64 
In his concluding remarks, Shepsle addresses the importance of two factors outside the 
standard winner/loser paradigm of invention and reaction to the art of heresthetics. 
Shepsle claims that institutions and institutional arrangements provide opportunities 
for a master heresthetician to exploit, or block, other avenues of invention from being 
taken by his opponents.65 An electoral system may provide easier or more difficult 
access for issue based movements to gain traction, and an executive structure may 
give a decisive incumbent the room to further disarm their opponents through 
unilateral action. Shepsle’s second important factor is vision, which refers to Riker’s 
claim that “politics is not only a game in which shrewdness, cunning, and 
resourcefulness are rewarded; it also rewards vision. This is the gift to see farther down 
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the game tree than anyone else, but also to imagine how the game itself might be 
transformed”.66 
Jack H. Nagel confirms the nature of politics as one of disequilibrium in Richard Seddon 
and the Art of Majority Rule, pointing to the prominence of chaos theorems in 
heresthetic practice and in political reality. Nagel states that “former losers can defeat 
any outcome with some other outcome that will attract the support of a different 
majority coalition”; therefore any result of a majority rule process, such as a legislative 
vote or election, can be reversed.67  This process of chronic instability and change is, 
according to Nagel, the norm in politics, particularly in majoritarian systems.68 
Nagel reinforces Riker and Shepsle’s views on heresthetics, particularly in relation to 
the art of rhetoric. Nagel states that the heresthetician “takes others’ preference as 
fixed, in contrast to rhetoric, which enables one to prevail by persuading others to 
change their preferences in the direction of one’s own”.69 Nagel interprets Riker’s 
heresthetics as the defining source of political change and innovation, with previous 
losers strategically inventing new policies that exploit underlying disequilibria in order 
to upset the status quo and turn themselves into winners.70 This is either through an 
issue-by-issue process, or the ‘Hail Mary’ approaches identified by Shepsle. Nagel cites 
Shepsle’s theory on structure and institutions, which attempts to explain the pauses in 
chaos in political systems that heresthetics do not seem to easily explain.  
Shepsle’s view, following from his position in Losers in Politics, is that a lack of constant 
flux can be explained by the role of institutions, and particularly a phenomenon known 
as SIE, or structure-induced-equilibria.71 The pause in disequilibrium occurring under an 
SIE occurs when institutions and procedures that protect against instability restrict 
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majority rule.72 A cogent example of this is the United States Senate, with its arcane 
rules governing the filibuster, cloture and majority decisions, in what can be described 
as extreme structure-induced-equilibrium. 
Nagel explains that ‘heresthetic-institutional’ theory departs from the traditional image 
of democracy, one that Riker would call ‘populism’. Nagel’s populism means that major 
policies in a democracy reflect the ‘will of the people’.73 According to Nagel, populism 
therefore implies that stability comes from the regular preferences of a majority of the 
people, while rapid change is a result of a change in the preferences of this group, in a 
process that is ‘satisfyingly democratic’.74 Government and democracy under a 
heresthetic leader only lends itself to stability when ‘disruptive issues are suppressed’, 
through agenda control or structural constraints, and rapid change only happens when 
the heresthetical offense of Shepsle’s political losers occurs.75  
William Riker’s views on majoritarianism, democracy and populism are particularly 
cogent in this case, and are canvassed in Nagel’s work.  Riker’s theory states that all 
majorities are fundamentally arbitrary, and there can be no substantive content or 
moral force to the notions of majority rule and popular will. Riker advocates 
institutions that can restrain majorities, and encourage the natural process of 
disequilibrium and heresthetic invention, such as bicameral legislatures, constitutions 
and the power of judicial review.76 Riker particularly condemned single party majority 
rule in the British Westminster system, stating that it is ‘the closest approximation to 
the populist ideal’.77 Riker’s view on the validity of a populist approach compared to a 
heresthetic approach is encapsulated in the following quote; “Populism fails, therefore, 
not because it is morally wrong, but merely because it is empty”.78 
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Criticism of Riker 
In Kellie Maske and Garey Durden’s The contributions and impact of Professor William 
H. Riker, the views of other theorists regarding Riker’s work is presented. Amadae and 
Bueno de Mesquita’s view that Riker’s assumption of the grounding of politics in the 
rational interest model may not always be cogent is a common thread throughout this 
discourse.79 Maske and Durden defend Riker’s theory, stating that “he seems to have 
viewed ‘rational actor’ behavioural analysis as an element that could be completely 
understood only within an existing (but dynamic) set of institutions. He came, ‘not to 
destroy Caesar but to praise him’, to provide missing pieces to an incomplete puzzle”.80  
Iain McLean canvasses the academic critiques of Riker’s theories in his Review Article of 
Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s), summarising the criticisms into three main 
groups: normative implications, the frequency of cycles, and the truth of the examples 
Riker uses.81 McLean addresses Riker’s dislike of the potential in systems for the 
tyranny of the majority, and majoritarianism in its many forms. Riker and his early 
theoretical lodestar, Joseph Schumpeter,82 insist, according to McLean, that the 
concept of a general popular will is incoherent, and that any political theories that 
claim to represent the popular will, such as the populism of the Laclau and Panizza 
schools, are intellectually redundant.83 This is because in a rational choice world, one in 
which Riker believes we operate, chaos theory tells us that all or at least many 
different possible platforms are in a cycle, with exchanging winning majorities, so, 
therefore, a consistent ‘will of the people’ cannot exist. Riker thought that non-
heresthetic and non-disequilibrium based analyses of political leadership and 
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outcomes were not only intellectually vacuous, but morally and practically undesirable 
if followed in practice in a society.84  
McLean asks why, in contrast to Riker’s theories of disequilibrium and creative 
invention from politicians, we see so much stability in political systems.85 McLean 
posits three replies to this question, which all partially run against Rikerian theory. The 
first is that equilibrium is structure induced, by institutions, as argued by Shepsle and 
Weingast,86 and accepted by Riker in his later work.87 The second reply is that Riker 
cherry-picked aspects of the original chaos theory results evident in early public choice 
theory. Some of the examples, such as the US Congress, were, in Schofield’s88 opinion, 
not relevant. McLean points to work in the academic field that has demonstrated 
different forms of stability occurring within multi-dimensional systems, running 
counter to Riker’s notion of disequilibrium.89 
McLean’s third reply is that in legislatures a roll call analysis of votes shows that the 
cycling of preferences is rare, and single-dimensionality on issues is actually far more 
common than Riker’s multidimensionality, a point supported by Poole and 
Rosenthal.9091 McLean introduces the argument of Gerry Mackie, who undertook an 
historical analysis of the major examples Riker uses for his theory, and finds that there 
are some notable errors in his method.92 For instance, Riker suggests that some 
politicians are smarter than others, and does this on an ad hoc basis to explain 
differences between seemingly similar outcomes; Riker also praises politicians he 
approves of when they manipulate their environment, but denigrates those he does 
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not agree with when they do the same.93 McLean, however, disagrees, and states that 
Riker admired all leaders who were proven herestheticians.94 
McLean argues that while much academic focus has been on what Riker got wrong, he 
also got many things right, particularly by identifying and attacking big and surprising 
questions and attempting to find answers to these issues, despite some flaws in his 
analysis.95 McLean points to notable difficulties in Riker’s focus on voting cycles, as it is 
often difficult to prove that a voting cycle had occurred, while it is also difficult to 
prove that a multidimensional issue choice resulted out of a heresthetic move.  
When multidimensionality is created from a previously static or binary issue dimension, 
McLean points to a conundrum which makes Riker’s theories very difficult to quantify; 
the question of whether issues arise from the clever move of a heresthetician as 
defined by Riker, or, as per Mackie, Green and Shapiro,96 the voting preferences of the 
electorate have already identified a new issue, and the pragmatic politician is merely 
responding to it.97  McLean accepts, however, that all Rikerian theory needs to show is 
that multidimensional issue space offers only the potential to construct a new winning 
majority, and herestheticians have an incentive to increase or decrease dimensionality 
according to their advantage, and most of Riker’s examples and historical application 
apply the tests his theory sets for itself.98  
McLean’s major disagreement with Riker emerges over the issue of relative 
intelligence; McLean posits that when using rational choice theory, information 
equilibria needs to be assumed in order for a fair analysis to take place, and Riker’s at 
times ad hoc attribution of relative intelligence and mental capability reduces the 
validity of his claims.99 Regarding the key theoretical tool this study derives from Riker, 
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heresthetic manoeuvring, McLean argues that while ‘structuring the world so you can 
win’ may not happen as frequently as claimed by Riker, when it does happen it 
matters.100 Riker’s legacy in McLean’s eyes is this concept, along with a form of 
historical analysis in which the analyst identifies a surprising political outcome, and 
then seeks to identify whether it was caused by heresthetic, rhetoric, or both. McLean 
admits that this technique is difficult, with Riker deserving scholarly praise for 
completing such a hard task.101 
Character Theory and Renshon 
The final theoretical framework discussed in this thesis is Stanley A. Renshon’s 
foundations of character. Renshon writes that the character of a political leader is 
made up of three psychological foundations. These foundations are ambition, 
character integrity and relatedness. Renshon writes that the capacity for a leader to 
satisfy their aspirations and political needs are defined by these foundations, and the 
outcome of their career is defined by them.102 
The Domain of Ambition 
Renshon identifies the contribution of Kohut,103 whose view is that “ambition, along 
with healthy narcissism, ideals and talent, is a foundation of a well-realized life”.104 
Renshon states that the “desire and ability to invest one’s self into accomplishing your 
life’s purposes”105 is a crucial tenet of ambition. Ambition is seen as crucial not just for 
political leaders, but for any person’s life and career. More specific to leadership 
analysis, Renshon explains that ambition is necessary for a candidate to reach higher 
office, and must be present in abundance to overcome the many challenges of politics. 
Renshon’s framework dictates that the seeds of adult ambition begin in childhood,  and 
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that “too little and too much ambition, which can hold back aspiring leaders, can be 
attributed to parental failure, through ignoring a child’s ‘budding grandiosity’, causing a 
lack of healthy narcissism, to over stimulating this aspect, gives a child unrealistic 
expectations of themselves and their abilities”.106 
The Domain of Character Integrity 
Renshon frames the domain of character integrity, the second foundation of a political 
leader’s character, as their ‘ideals and the capacity to realise them’.107 Renshon’s 
character integrity is made up of ideas and values which are formed early in life that 
form a ‘coherent personal identity’. These ideals, often unrealistic, become values as 
the leader gains the tools to attempt to use them to affect change. Renshon identifies 
the analysis of Erikson108 as useful for understanding this concept. Erikson writes that 
the ego identity represents ideals realised but constantly revised, and the ego ideal 
refers to ideals never reached but constantly aspired to. A leader’s character integrity 
can only be secure and able to withstand conflict if the leader lives by these ideals, and 
is believed by the public when their political platform appears merged with their ideals. 
The first foundation, ambition, is necessary in order to fulfil this process to its 
completion, and Renshon identifies Kohut’s theory that high ambition is not always 
destructive to this, and can be helpful, but not if ideals are ultimately self-serving. 
The Domain of Relatedness 
Renshon’s third foundation of character, relatedness, is summarised as ‘one’s basic 
stance towards relationships with others’.109 Renshon writes that relatedness is 
whether someone moves towards others, such as by reaching out to them; moves 
away from others, such as leaving relationships that are disappointing or no longer 
useful; or moves against others, such as when someone wants contact but cannot 
obtain it in a friendly or intimate fashion. Relatedness is connected to the previously 
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discussed foundation of character integrity; “ideals develop out of relationships, and 
our sense of self and ability to live within these ideals is informed by relationships with 
significant others”.110 Harry Stack Sullivan writes that the self is the ‘sum of reflected 
appraisals’,111 and Renshon uses this point to reinforce the importance of relatedness. 
Crucially, Renshon states that “measuring one’s accomplishments, or succeeding with 
the help of others, help validate ambition and ideals, linking all three foundations 
through the paradigm of interpersonal relationships”.112 In this way, the three 
foundations are linked to form a basis for character, but it should be noted that 
personality is also informed by character style – the product of the three foundations 
of character merged with personal skills and resources.  
While Renshon looks at how these three different characterological elements interact 
dynamically within individual leaders, and then manifests in the political realm, this 
study will focus on the third characterological dimension, relatedness. A full 
psychological analysis and its relationship with populism awaits future study. However, 
given an unusual (and frequently defining) aspect of populist politicians is their inability 
to operate within small groups, as elaborated upon in Chapter Six, this study’s focus on 
how each subject relates to other political actors, as well as with the voting public, is 
considered to add a further qualitative layer of explanation to the overall analysis of 
respective case study subjects. 
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Chapter Three – Case Study: John A. Lee 
Introduction 
Labour Party rebel John A. Lee’s career has yet to be critiqued through the prism of 
populist leadership theory. Lee’s personal contribution to New Zealand politics and 
scholarship is significant, as the author of many novels, biographies, journals and 
pamphlets.113 Lee forged a legacy through his oratory, his large personal following, and 
his fearlessness. This study will attempt to analyse Lee in a new way, examining the 
foundations for his popular support and the reasons for his political demise, in order to 
reach a conclusion regarding his personal brand of populism. The chapter owes much 
to the excellent biographical work undertaken by historian Erik Olssen and political 
scientist John T. Henderson.114 
This study hypothesises that Lee’s leadership will be close to the style identified by 
Panizza and Laclau’s populism theories. This hypothesis will be tested by a study of key 
events and decisions in Lee’s political career. These examples will be contrasted with 
events and decisions that indicate heresthetics and heresthetical positioning. Finally, 
the application of Gustafson’s six point framework of New Zealand populist leadership 
will show that Lee meets five of the criteria. 
This application of theory will show that Lee’s populism is closely linked to the 
theoretical models of Panizza and Laclau. The low number and success of heresthetic 
examples will help to explain Lee’s lack of long term political success, and why he was 
unlikely to ever reach the height of the Prime Ministership. 
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Early Life 
John Albert Alexander Lee was born on the 31st of October 1891 in Dunedin to Mary 
Lee, a seamstress, and Alfredo Lee, a gambler and entertainer.115 Lee experienced a 
childhood of repressive and visceral poverty, which shaped his worldview and provided 
a basis for the political career that lay ahead of him.  Lee’s part gypsy father, who was 
originally from the Hawkes Bay, travelled throughout the South Island in the late 
1800s, finding work as a labourer and entertainer, before meeting Mary Taylor in a 
South Otago mining town in 1889.116 Mary was raised by a family described by Erik 
Olssen as “poised between the gutter and the respectability of the lower middle 
class”.117 Forced to work in domestic service at the age of twelve, Mary and her father 
were subjected to the alcoholism of her mother, who would drink her and her father’s 
wages, creating a dangerous home environment in which Mary was beaten to the point 
of deafness by her mother.118 
 
Alfredo moved to the country to continue his vagabond lifestyle and search for work in 
1896, but never returned. By that point Mary Lee was supporting her parents, her two 
brothers and her children. The family moved to Riversdale, on the Waimea Plains, 
following work Mary’s father had found. Young Lee embraced this rural lifestyle, 
playing in the paddocks and learning to read before he went to school, interrupted 
only by the terrifying spells of his drunken grandmother, experiences that taught Lee 
the life-draining damage of alcoholism.119  
 
The Lees returned to a small house in Dunedin and a life of poverty, reliant on the 
goodwill and charity of others when times became too tough. Lee tells of living in a 
                                                          
115
 Erik Olssen, John A. Lee, Dunedin, 1977, p. 1 
116
 Ibid. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 Olssen, p. 2 
119
 Mary Lee, Unpublished Autobiography, pp. 73-74, in Olssen, p. 2 
39 
 
“New World slum, a two-roomed shack down a narrow lane”.120 By this time his 
mother’s meagre income was supplemented by prostitution, a fact that brought shame 
on his family in the eyes of others, but one which Lee defended as necessary to clothe 
and feed the family: the action of a desperate mother searching for a last resort.121 Lee 
had held down a job selling newspapers, but left to roam the countryside in search of 
work after his workmates asked him to procure his sister, Rose, who was also working 
as a prostitute, for sex. Lee did not blame his mother or sister for their predicament, as 
he knew that he only avoided their fate due to his gender.122 
Burnham 
Lee, desperate and without direction, dodged school and began a life of crime. He lost 
a job for stealing some of the proceeds of sales, and increased his involvement in petty 
theft in order to maintain the wage that he was sending to his mother to keep the 
family afloat. Lee was caught stealing from a metal foundry at age fourteen, and was 
sent to Burnham Industrial School, a reform school for delinquent children run in 
military style.  Lee dedicated himself to excellence, in both work and rebellion. He 
became a hard worker at a printing factory and on a local farm when not at school, 
whilst also rising to the top of the school class in academic performance. After 
attaining these successes, however, Lee quickly became bored, and noted that his drive 
only came when he was under emotional stress, that he was “never made for routine 
work where the pace is set by the average”, and that he constantly needed to redefine 
the measures of success he set himself.123 Lee ran away after rebelling against the 
repressive authority of Burnham, only to be brought back again multiple times and 
flogged mercilessly.  Lee vowed to continue to rebel to prove that “he was of the stuff 
that endures unto the end”.124 This is encapsulated in the following reflection of John 
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A. Lee as a teenager: “Out of battered flesh that refused to yell in agony would come 
the will to further rebellion, the will to sneer in authority’s very teeth”.125 
 
Lee continued a life of crime on his escapes from Burnham, and was finally sentenced 
to a year in Mt Eden prison after being charged with theft. Lee grew weary and 
unfulfilled with this life, and decided that he must move on to something new. He felt a 
great need to engage his sharp and able mind, but was restricted by his situation and 
poverty, describing his predicament as a “tug of war between the flesh and the 
mind”.126 
Political Awakening and ‘The Jungle’ 
Following his release from prison, Lee was directionless, at times suicidal, and unsure 
of his place in an unfair and punitive world. Lee could relate to few adults in his life. 
This changed after reading American journalist and novelist Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, 
a story of working class struggle in oppressive working conditions and poverty in the 
meatpacking district of early 1900s Chicago.127  The book’s central character, outcast 
immigrant worker Jurgis Rudkis, provided Lee with his first relatable adult character, 
and a working class hero. Without fully realising what the term meant at the time, Lee 
stated that the political agitation and calls for organised labour action in the novel 
‘made him a socialist on the spot’, and opened his eyes to the choices that had allowed 
for poverty.128 Politics came to him as an “amazing revelation…. someone stood for the 
working man”.129 Lee began debating at the workplace, and was found to be an 
exceptional debater and soapbox preacher. He became radicalised in the labour 
movement, and vowed to become a crucial cog of the movement through the pen and 
on the soapbox.130 
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War 
With an eager sense of adventure, and a desire to have new direction in his life, Lee 
enlisted for service in Europe with the New Zealand Division.131 Lee engaged in political 
debates, wrote for the newspaper of the division (the Chronicles of the N.Z.E.F) and 
enjoyed serving with like-minded men. He received the Distinguished Combat Medal 
for single-handedly capturing and defending a machine-gun post,132 and delved into 
further reading between combat. His dedication to his new passion was evident; his 
field kit was heavy with books on social subjects, and his comrades noted that they had 
seen him studying his works while under heavy fire in the trenches.133 On 21 March 
1918 the German Army launched an offensive designed to end the war, and 5 days 
later the New Zealand Division, Lee included, held the line at Mailly Maillet. By May, it 
was noted in the Chronicles that Lee was alive, but a casualty in a hospital in England, 
having had his arm amputated.134 Before leaving the hospital to return to New Zealand, 
Lee helped edit the Chronicles, enjoyed his time with his fellow New Zealanders in his 
recovery period, and engaged in political debates in London.135 In August 1918, Lee 
travelled back to New Zealand, and within two days of arrival had married the farmer’s 
daughter, Marie Guy, whom he had left at home, and joined the New Zealand Labour 
Party.136 
Labour 
As a new and exciting soapbox speaker, Lee drew large crowds and started to attain 
influence in the party, partly because of his unique appeal as a wounded war hero.137 
Labour won eight seats in the 1919 election, including the seats of West, Central and 
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Grey Lynn in Auckland.138 Lee successfully ran for the Presidency of the Auckland 
Labour Party, and, once elected, strengthened the organisation, making it more active 
on the ground in local elections. Lee won a seat on the executive of the Auckland 
Returned Servicemen’s Association, bringing himself closer to the problems of their 
membership, including poverty, unemployment, and support for the disabled.139 The 
RSA at this time was increasingly anti-immigrant, particularly towards Asians. A by-
election in Auckland East caused an opening to emerge for a Labour candidate and 
after cajoling by the Parliamentary wing of the party, Lee sought the nomination and 
won by one vote. Pushing Labour’s programme of increased equality and democracy, 
along with advocacy for the feminist movement and the beginnings of a xenophobic 
and anti-Catholic platform, Lee came within 400 votes of capturing the seat for 
Labour.140  
 
The Reform Party candidate who was a friend of Lee’s from the war, Clutha MacKenzie, 
won the seat, but a poll taken on Election Day showing that many Liberal voters were 
moving towards the Labour Party was a promising sign.141 Lee stressed that the 
outcome of a Reform win should not move Labour and the Liberals closer to a potential 
coalition, stating that “we can march alone, and march faster, without the useless 
encumber of dead parties”.142 In the 1922 General Election, Lee once again sought and 
gained the nomination, and this time won the Auckland East seat for Labour, winning 
four polling booths on the back of a large working class vote. Lee’s constituency 
contained Mt Eden prison, where he had been held as a prisoner. Nationally, Labour 
won the votes of the urban poor, but was rejected in the provinces.143 Crucially, 
however, Labour was now a major player, at the expense of the dying Liberal Party, 
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and the rebel Lee had broken through into the cosy establishment setting of 
Parliament.144 
Theory Application 
This study hypothesises that Lee’s leadership will closely fit the leadership style 
identified by Panizza and Laclau’s populism theorems. An attempt will be made to 
contrast examples supporting this with events and decisions that indicate the use of 
heresthetics, and heresthetical positioning, as described by Riker and Shepsle.  
Practical examples of Lee’s populism include attacks on the political establishment, and 
establishing in- and out- groups of immigrants, Maori and Catholics, in the style of 
Panizza and Laclau’s populist who divides society into a ‘people’ and an ‘other’. Further 
examples include Lee’s ability to relate to the common man, the rise of his idolism, and 
the domination of his political vehicle, the Democratic Labour Party. Strategic decisions 
that could be identified as heresthetics include Lee’s great political success, the 
stewardship of Labour’s state housing scheme, and his unsuccessful attempts to 
strategically position the Democratic Soldier Labour Party to appeal to differing, 
contradictory voting groups in the 1943 general election. These examples will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
A Thorn in the Side of the Establishment 
Lee quickly adjusted positively to life in Parliament, enjoying the company of his fellow 
young caucus members, railing against the old guard of the House, and quickly gaining 
a reputation as a witty, engaging, and pointed orator.145  While Labour and Lee focused 
much of their efforts on the tiring Reform Party government, internal ructions within 
Labour, and his role in them, also became a hallmark of Lee’s early parliamentary 
career. As would become common throughout his career, Lee attacked the party 
establishment, especially its plans to nationalise land.146 Lee believed that a rapid 
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elevation to full socialism in New Zealand was politically and practically impossible, and 
that a nationalisation programme would scare away the small farmers and urban 
section owners necessary for a national election victory.147  
 
Labour became more agrarian in its campaign approach leading into the 1925 election, 
referring to themselves as “a body of men determined to carry on the principles of the 
Seddon Government”.148 According to Lee, Labour was ‘on the march’ in 1925, buoyed 
by distress in the dairy regions and a disorganised Liberal Party that was close to 
merging with the Reform Party. Lee held his seat with a majority of 750 votes in 1925, 
but Labour lost five seats, including two city seats. Internal debates in Labour blamed 
both a hostile press and an excessive commitment to doctrinaire socialism.  Lee was in 
a strong position, however, a popular member in a small caucus, ready to assert his 
influence.149 
 
Lee entered the 1928 election campaign confident of holding his seat, despite 
boundary changes sending the two strong Labour areas of Auckland East into Michael 
Joseph Savage’s Auckland West seat. The Liberals (now the United Party) had selected 
Sir Joseph Ward as leader, who Lee did not believe to be a strong candidate. Lee 
viewed Gordon Coates and Reform as vulnerable, as they had alienated much of their 
urban base. Lee claimed that his goal was to ‘stop the human family from living in a 
pigsty’, and he attacked the local United candidate as a spent force. Ward’s United 
Party won 28 seats, and while Reform lost heavily, Labour’s amended land plans failed 
to win country voters. Lee lost to the United candidate by 37 votes. According to 
Olssen, key Lee supporters, such as skilled workers and pacifists, were believed to have 
stayed home on Election Day.150  
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Lee was now out of Parliament. Jobless and broke, Lee took a job managing a hotel in 
Rotorua. While disconnected from party politics, Lee remained engaged, writing 
articles and beginning work on his novels. Lee refined his positions, and came to the 
conclusion that economic independence for New Zealand rather than the 
nationalisation of industry was the way forward for Labour, and he soon was set on 
returning to Parliament.151 
1931 Re-Election 
Lee sought the Labour nominations for Auckland East and Grey Lynn in 1930, and won 
both, choosing to run in Grey Lynn. Complaints from the losing candidate in Grey Lynn 
over illegal union approaches to delegates caused the selection process to be re-run, 
which Lee won convincingly,152 although he could not prevent the aggrieved candidate 
running as an Independent. Lee won in a 4 way race with 60 percent of the vote in four 
polling booths. Labour won four more seats,153 and while many in the party were 
downcast that the victory over the United-Reform coalition had not yet arrived, Lee 
saw that it was close.154 He stated that Labour could win all seats held by the old 
Liberal Party, and that the ruling coalition of interests could not survive.155 Lee 
attended and spoke at large protest marches and meetings of workers and the 
unemployed as the Great Depression began to hit, events which were fast becoming 
violent. The Coalition was rapidly losing touch with the New Zealand people, 
particularly in the cities, and the reduction in the pension in a monetarist effort to 
stave off debt exacerbated this.156   
 
Labour’s leader Harry Holland died in 1933, and Lee attempted to ensure that the more 
moderate Michael Joseph Savage did not become leader. Lee cajoled other candidates 
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to oppose Savage, including Peter Fraser, but when they were not willing to go up 
against the Labour Party establishment and union support Savage held, he reluctantly 
threw his hat in the ring, only to withdraw soon thereafter when defeat was obvious. 
Savage won uncontested, and historian Erik Olssen theorises that Savage never forgave 
Lee for his attempts to prevent his rise to the leadership. A profile written by Lee of 
Savage the day after the selection demonstrates the contempt he felt for Savage’s 
brand of socialism, in which Lee describes him as ‘dull, stodgy, ponderous in thought’, a 
man who ‘enjoys a good joke but never cracks one’, convinced of the sinful nature of 
sex, and who views socialism as merely the fair division of goods, rather than the 
‘opportunity to play football, get brown on a beach, dance a foxtrot, lie on one’s back 
beneath the trees, enjoy the intoxication of verse,  the perfume of flowers, the joys of 
a novel, the thrill of music’.157  
 
Lee was the personal opposite of Savage, and their contempt for each other would last 
throughout their careers. Around this time, Lee’s first novel, Children of the Poor, was 
released, an eponymous tale of the squalor of his childhood. While highly 
controversial, receiving condemnation and bans from the conservative establishment, 
the book was publically successful, and in the words of Olssen, “his onslaught on 
Victorian sensibilities helped create a freer atmosphere within which other New 
Zealand artists could grow and work”.158 Savage found the book ‘unscrupulous and 
salacious’.159  
Exclusion from Cabinet 
Lee stumped vigorously for Labour in the 1935 election campaign, conveying the anger 
of the party rank-and-file, drawing large and electrified audiences, and wooing the 
followers of the nascent Social Credit movement of Major Douglas by attacking 
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bankers and demanding further national issues of credit.160 This strategy helped Labour 
in the small towns and rural areas that had previously been out of their reach. Labour 
proposed to insulate the New Zealand economy and fund its plans through national 
control of credit,161 a policy Lee had advocated since 1930. Lee romped home in Grey 
Lynn with a massive majority, as Labour swept to power with 52 seats in Parliament. 162  
 
Lee felt he was surely headed to Cabinet, in either the Defence or the High 
Commissioner to London roles, due to his service and support to the newly enlarged 
caucus.163 After Savage was confirmed as Prime Minister, Lee was informed that he 
would only be offered the position of Under Secretary to the Prime Minister. Initially 
accepting the explanations of geography and inexperience for this slight, Lee later 
learned that Fraser and Nash had both pushed Savage to appoint Lee, with his wide 
influence and following, to Cabinet. Savage’s personal dislike of Lee thwarted this, and 
only further pressure forced Savage to offer the consolation role to Lee.164  
 
Lee and his fellow ‘young-guns’, newly elected leftist MPs, were a thorn in the Prime 
Minister’s side, and pushed Savage to enlarge the size of Cabinet and to accept certain 
caucus positions he otherwise would not have. During a fiery debate on pensions and 
cabinet election, Lee sided with the rebels and stated his intention to resign the 
symbolic post of Under-Secretary unless he was placed in Cabinet by Savage.165 Due to 
their animosity and Savage’s distrust of Lee, this was impossible, but Savage decided to 
make Lee the Director of Housing under the Prime Minister in order to make use of 
Lee’s talent and to avoid further splits in the party. Lee accepted, despite some 
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pressure for him to continue to rebel and play a long game for the leadership. The 
housing shortage crisis was now in Lee’s hands. 166  
Heresthetics and Housing 
Lee was energised in his new role, buoyed by an opportunity to effect popular and 
socialist change through the implementation of Labour’s state housing plans. Lee 
pushed for high quality and affordable houses, and deftly manoeuvred around 
sectional interests, notably private construction firms and the building unions. Lee 
employed successful heresthetics to outmanoeuvre union interests, setting up 
scenarios in which their support was guaranteed despite grievances over pay, while 
also securing the construction services of James Fletcher and his powerful firm at a 
reasonable price. Lee established multidimensionality through the strategic options he 
presented to both parties, allowing the government to claim success when progress on 
housing seemed unlikely. Lee did his best public policy work in this period, executing 
Labour’s plans with “vision, taste and skill”,167 and using the best principles of town 
planning to build suburbs ‘fit for Ministers of the Crown’.168 Lee became a master 
pragmatist, but only when the result would still fit with his idealistic vision, and he 
gained a reputation as being able to get approval from Finance Minister Walter Nash 
faster than any other Cabinet Minister.169  
 
Lee’s skills were evident in how he brought both the militant unions and James 
Fletcher on the side of the housing scheme, and his rhetorical ability was demonstrated 
in the House in a series of masterly speeches on state housing in Labour’s first term.170 
Although the scheme had not gone as far as he liked - as workers had lost some control 
over the projects, rents were not flexible in some areas, and the slums that had 
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blighted his early life were not fully cleared - overall, Lee was successful. Savage had 
appointed Lee in expectation of his abrasive style bringing about failure in the 
portfolio, and Lee’s success therefore angered Savage.171 Savage replaced Lee with Tim 
Armstrong as Minister of Housing in December 1938, permanently cementing the 
distrust and animosity held between the two symbols of the initial stages of the First 
Labour Government. 
Populism in Cabinet  
While Lee was Minister of Housing, he attempted to aggressively remove Maori from 
customary land, indicating a populist defining of a separate ‘other’, outside of his 
perception of the populist ‘people’. Lee viewed Maori land claims to be flimsy, and he 
only respected Maori who had assimilated closer to the Pakeha ideal of civility. This 
was demonstrated by his attempt as Minister of Housing to remove 120 Maori from 
land in Orakei to construct state housing and clear slum land, in which he dismissed 
legal, moral and tribal concerns, and was only forced to back down from the illegal 
action by public pressure from religious and rights groups.172  
Expulsion and Psychopathology 
Lee’s relationship with Savage became increasingly strained throughout Labour’s 
second term, 1938-43, which was achieved in an electoral landslide in 1938. The left 
faction of the parliamentary party, most of its members not in Cabinet, became 
frustrated with the methods the Prime Minister used to slow down the process of 
socialist reform, including refusing to accept decisions made by the majority of caucus. 
Lee damaged the hopes of reconciliation between the two blocs by attacking Savage 
himself, despite the genuine grievances that he could have attacked instead. Lee 
believed that Savage’s massive public popularity had turned him into a petty dictator, 
no better than the guards of the Burnham school. Advice was given to Lee to tone 
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down his attacks, but he countered that if he swallowed his opinions he would no 
longer have been Jack Lee, only a shadow of someone else.173  
 
Savage’s increasingly petulant replies to Lee’s arguments over policy led to Lee calling 
Savage a ‘spoilt child’ following a particular incident in relation to amending election 
policy. Savage sat in a private room by himself after Lee would not withdraw his 
statement that Savage had pulled a ‘slippery trick’.174 Lee embraced these arguments, 
as he would always win the battle of rhetoric, and could emotionally outlast Savage. As 
Savage grew unwell near the end of his Prime Ministership, Lee believed that the 
increasingly rattled and introverted Prime Minister was unfit to govern. He let this be 
known at a Cabinet meeting, directly calling Savage ‘mentally sick’.175 Lee had an article 
anonymously published in the influential socialist journal Tomorrow, called 
Psychopathology in Politics, and with this move many in the party believed Lee’s 
combativeness had gone too far, and demanded his expulsion.176  
 
Psychopathology referred to Savage indirectly, talking of a leader who is “vain of mind 
and short of temper, and believes that everybody who crosses his path has demoniac 
attributes. Wherever this problem occurred, except that the party managed to cut off 
the diseased limb, it went down to crushing defeat”.177 With Lee’s signature writing 
style evident in the article, it became clear to those who knew how sick Savage was, 
that he was the target of the diatribe. Lee wanted the left to regain power, and 
thought that this would position himself to become leader ahead of Fraser. Mainly, 
however, this was Lee being himself, and saying what he believed with no thought to 
the practical consequences: a true rebel. Such an article would have been vitriolic from 
the National opposition, but from an Under-Secretary of Cabinet a severe punishment 
was never in doubt.  
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On the 25th of March 1940 the Labour Party assembled for its conference, with Lee and 
the article at the top of the agenda. A note from Savage himself was read out, calling 
Lee’s attacks ‘from the political sewer’, adding that it was ‘making his life a living hell’. 
The conference heard of Savage’s closeness to death, and the apparent recovery that 
was blighted and reversed when Savage heard of the article.178 Lee was accused of 
stabbing Savage in the back, with Fraser stating that it would have been more decent 
for Lee to have shot Savage dead.179 As the debate on Lee’s proposed expulsion began, 
Lee encapsulated the reasons for his insurrection in a speech, and defended his 
methods in the face of attacks from delegates on his conduct and his character, in 
which they referred to Lee as ‘from the gutter’ and ‘worthy of a guttersnipe’.180 Lee 
stated that “I came into the Labour movement the day I stepped out of khaki because I 
am a socialist. Maybe I came into it because being hunted gave me the character Mr 
Stewart says I lack… While a woman is making a living by selling her soul then, by God, 
I’m in the gutter with her… I’ve put a lot of energy into the Labour cause. I’ve loved the 
movement… If I go, I’ll go determined to work harder than ever for the things for which 
I stand”.181 
 
Lee was expelled from Labour on a 546-344 card vote,182 although there was no 
celebration in a sombre conference hall. A New Zealand Herald editorial stated that 
“he was caught in a conflict of loyalties and may claim that what he stood for were the 
higher loyalties, the principle and the word rather than the person and the practice”.183 
An idealistic rebel more than a parliamentarian, Lee’s time as a power player in a major 
political party was over, as was any chance of future influence over government. Lee’s 
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personal need for struggle and challenge was not finished, however, and he 
immediately began to work on a new voice for New Zealand’s downtrodden.184 
The Democratic Labour Party – A Movement Dominated by its Leader 
Lee believed that he could convince part of the left faction of the Labour caucus to join 
his new party, which was based on radical socialism and opposed a Labour Party he 
labelled “beyond redemption”.185 Following the formation of the Democratic Labour 
Party shortly after the Labour Party conference, however, only Speaker Bill Barnard 
and half of Lee’s Grey Lynn branches came over to the DLP. Lee and Barnard went on a 
speaking tour of New Zealand, signing up hundreds of Labour activists who were 
dissatisfied with the moderate course the party was undertaking. Post-expulsion, the 
branch membership of the Labour Party notably dropped.186 Lee established a populist 
platform that appealed to the disaffected, supporting the war but not conscription, 
demanding no reduction in the standard of living or working conditions, and pushing 
for a term that was derived from his soldier heritage: a ‘conscription of wealth’.187 Lee 
strategically appealed to these sentiments and war weariness in the New Zealand 
public, and much of the early momentum of the DLP can be attributed to Lee’s success 
in voicing the fears and suspicions of others.188  
 
Lee and the DLP distributed radical pamphlets, calling Savage a hypocrite for his own 
attacks on Joseph Ward as a sick Prime Minister in office, and containing the full 
Psychopathology article.189 The DLP newspaper, John A. Lee’s Weekly, began 
distribution in July 1940, with Lee editing and writing much of the content. Lee’s 
personality was both a blessing and a curse for the DLP, with many members pushing 
for Lee to reduce his role as leader, strategist and policymaker. Lee referred to the 
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party as ‘his’, an unsustainable position for a socialist movement. Branches began to 
break away, and key members of the executive went to the press with their complaints 
of Lee’s dominant and overbearing approach.190  
Populist Party Platform – Appeals to Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Catholic Sentiment 
The party was growing tired191 of what Olssen refers to as Lee’s “xenophobia, his anti-
union tirades, and his jingoism”.192 Lee looked to form a new coalition of voters, 
making attempts to appeal to the Social Credit supporters of the early 1930s, and 
middle-class small businessmen in opposition to Labour’s tax plans, in a pragmatic 
move away from the radical socialist approach of the party’s founding.193 A by-election 
after the death of a left-wing Labour MP in Waitemata provided the first electoral test 
for the DLP, in which its candidate, Lee acolyte Norman Douglas, came a disappointing 
third after a dirty campaign in which Labour attacked Lee’s conduct, early life and the 
content of his novels.194 The DLP slowly withered, save for the occasional article in 
Lee’s Weekly, and Lee focussed on assailing all comers in the House, and became 
increasingly xenophobic against Catholics in his statements.195 Lee began attacking the 
Catholic Church and its links to European fascism, in what he called the ‘Christian 
Corporate State’. Lee labelled the Pope a supporter of fascism, as long as fascism 
upheld the rights of Catholics. Protestant political groups sided with Lee on some of 
these points, but the Government chose to ignore Lee, as it did on many issues that 
were designed to provoke and cause division, fearful of the social impact Lee could 
have.196  
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Lee reactivated the DLP through the Weekly to contest a by-election in 1943. The DLP 
pushed for scholarships to university students, a family tax credit, equal pay legislation, 
arts and music funding, and extending the vote to 18 year olds. Lee and the DLP 
candidate attacked the Government for stabilising inequality through the stalling of 
socialist policies, and they criticised the direction of the Labour-National war cabinet. 
The DLP finished a strong second, giving it momentum going into the general election 
of 1943, and the party was renamed the Democratic Soldier Labour Party, in a nod to 
Lee’s military past.197  
 
Lee’s domineering ways and dismissal of many ex-DSLP loyalists led the only other MP, 
Bill Barnard, to quit the party. The DSLP’s chances were further hit when National 
decided to run candidates in the working class urban seats, although the DSLP was 
buoyed by strong candidates, particularly radio preacher Colin Scrimgeour in 
Wellington Central, who faced Prime Minister Peter Fraser (who replaced Savage on 
the latter’s death on the 27th of March 1940). Vastly popular socialist Scrimgeour had 
been taken off the air by the Government after Savage’s death for calling for Lee’s 
return to Labour.198  
Heresthetic Attempt to Broaden Voting Base 
The DSLP’s slate of candidates was mostly nationalistic in zeal, and xenophobic,199 in 
the same style as Lee himself, although often the message was confused, with some 
candidates standing on free-enterprise soldier platforms.200 This heresthetic attempt to 
broaden the political coalition of the DSLP by trying to gain the support of pro-
business, pro-military voters was unsuccessful, demonstrating the unwieldiness of 
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using a populist movement constructed around an idolism and cult of personality to 
expand into multidimensional rational voting choices. 
Departure from Parliament 
On election night, Lee lost his Grey Lynn seat, polling 23.29% of the vote, the DSLP won 
no other seats; and cost Labour five marginal seats by splitting the anti-National vote. 
Lee’s time in Parliament was over.201 Lee left the DSLP, which survived in name only for 
a few more years. His focus moved to writing books, and editing and distributing the 
Weekly, which continued in various forms until 1954, at great financial cost to the Lees, 
but providing a much needed release for his still boundless energy and determination 
to speak and fight.202 He lived out his days writing, which was his true love; and 
managing a small book shop in Grey Lynn. Lee received an honorary degree in 1969 
from the University of Otago.203  
Legacy 
The rebel was finally at peace with his life, his work, and his family. His sizeable body of 
work stands as a testament to his passion and drive, and he was recognised by the 
retiring Chief Parliamentary Reporter in 1973 as the greatest orator to ever be heard in 
the New Zealand Parliament.204 
The Gustafson Framework and John A. Lee 
The preceding analysis in this chapter explored John A. Lee’s political career in the 
context of two competing strands of theory; traditional populism and heresthetics. This 
analysis found that cogent examples of traditional populism significantly outweigh the 
occurrence of clear heresthetic manoeuvres in Lee’s case. As posited in the 
introduction, it is hypothesised that through application of Gustafson’s model of 
populist political leadership, we will find that Lee, as a leader who more comfortably 
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fits Panizza and Laclau’s framework, will also be accurately described by Gustafson’s 
theory. This will be tested by applying each of Gustafson’s six criteria to Lee, with a 
number being provided after this analysis stating how many out of the six Lee has met. 
As the preceding sections of this chapter have already canvassed Lee’s career, and 
uncovered events and decisions related to his style of populism, the Gustafson 
application draws from the empirical evidence previously identified. It is to be viewed 
as a critical reading of the previous discussion, and does not draw from new sources. 
The Six Criteria 
1. The leader claims to know what ‘ordinary’ people desire and believe, in contrast to 
corrupted and ignorant political parties and leaders of the established elite.  
Throughout his career, John A. Lee railed against the establishment on both the left 
and the right. Borne out of the experience of the depression conditions of the early 
1900’s, Lee entered politics and based his career around the common hardships of 
working people in New Zealand. After growing up poor and on the run throughout his 
youth, and fighting a war in the name of an establishment which Lee found it difficult 
to support, his type of socialist activism focussed strongly on the structural problem of 
the elite holding back progress. His dislike for the moderates of Labour, such as Savage 
and Nash, was public and widespread. Lee, an effective propagandist, railed against the 
United and Reform governments of the Depression years, hammering them for being 
out of touch with the working man, and on issues of national military and financial 
sovereignty. Lee’s distaste for established and entrenched power ultimately led to his 
downfall, while being one of his touchstones for popular support among voters. 
- Criterion Met - 
2. The leader draws their support from the marginalised and out-of-power, particularly 
during recession and rapid change.  
Lee can be seen as a quintessential example of such a populist; he drew his initial 
public support by speaking about unemployment and poverty in the urban slums of 
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Auckland, from people marginalised by both politics and the economic system, and 
could do so from a position of genuine empathy and shared experience. As he rose in 
Parliament, large crowds followed this message; and his highest political position, 
managing the Government’s large social housing construction, followed the 
marginalisation of the Great Depression. In rebellion against the moderates of his own 
party, Lee drew public support from the marginalised: those who believed that the 
party had failed to achieve the socialist dream that its propagandists (including Lee) 
had espoused. These supporters, who were also damaged by the rapid change of 
wartime and the political concentration of the two major forces in politics in the 
wartime cabinet, also aided Lee’s Democratic Soldier Labour Party. 
- Criterion Met - 
3. The leader is anti-elitist, and sees hidden agendas behind decisions that affect 
business and government, that are detrimental to the ‘silent majority’.  
Lee had little respect for authority; even as he became part of the elite politicians in 
charge of running the country’s public finances, and his rebellious nature caused 
tension. Throughout the policy formulation processes with Labour and the 
Government, Lee struck out in private, and at times in public, against the relationship 
between the fiscal moderates in his party and the banks, which he wanted to 
nationalise. More controversially, his comments on the relationship between some 
political leaders and the Catholic Church indicate a willingness to embrace hidden 
agenda theories and conspiracies. 
- Criterion Met - 
4. The leader is nationalistic, inward looking and opposed to foreign ‘meddling’ or 
investment. This can sometimes be ethnocentric and racist. Immigration is a common 
issue in which a ‘them-us’ divide is forged.  
Lee, like many of his contemporaries, was distrustful of immigrants, blaming them for 
the loss of jobs that would have otherwise gone to people born in New Zealand. Lee’s 
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positions included a particular antipathy towards the Chinese, as was common in New 
Zealand politics since the beginning of the party era. Lee, possibly as a product of his 
military service, was more nationalistic and patriotic than some of his fellows on the 
left. One issue in which Lee fought on multiple occasions with the moderates in Labour 
was credit, and foreign borrowing. Running against established monetary policy, Lee 
pushed for New Zealand to cut international financial ties and establish a Social Credit 
system of homemade borrowing, involving nationalisation of all banks and financial 
houses in New Zealand. Lee also had an anti-Catholic streak, and referred to fascist 
conspiracies involving the papacy. As canvassed on page 49, Lee showed displayed a 
disposition against Maori land claims and efforts to assert Maori sovereignty. 
- Criterion Met - 
5. The leader uses a simplified nostalgia to hark back to a ‘Golden Age’ of prosperity 
and security.   
Lee, as a committed and vocal socialist, viewed political history immediately prior to 
the First Labour Government as anathema to his political aims. While Lee recalls his 
camaraderie with his fellow soldiers in nostalgic terms, his own past and experience 
was defined by visceral poverty and a lack of engagement by the state. Lee uses a form 
of simplified rhetoric to hark forward to a socialist future, where unemployment and 
poverty would only be found in history. While noting the legacy of the reforming 
Liberal governments, Lee is critical of past conservative governments, business and 
community leaders, and of the Labour Party as he becomes disheartened by the First 
Labour Government’s moderate direction. 
- Criterion Not Met - 
6. The leader is the operational leader of the movement, section or party but comes to 
embody it publically.  
From the beginning of Lee’s political career his powerful rhetoric drew people towards 
him. Lee’s particular appeal to veterans and his oft-repeated exclamations in support 
59 
 
of the returning soldier, even as an early backbencher, provided a foundation for his 
life in politics. A strong personal following, first achieved in Auckland, that could be 
seen in the impressive crowds that would meet him at street corner meetings and 
political agitations, developed in Lee’s early parliamentary career before entering 
Cabinet. Publication of his early novels and political writings rapidly spread his name, 
and due to their controversy added to his growing cult of personality. As his 
relationship with Labour deteriorated, Lee increasingly began to call on his large 
following for support. With his split from Labour and the formation of the Democratic 
Soldier Labour Party, his transformation was complete. The party was built around Lee, 
operationally run by Lee, and was defined by his career and personality. Lee’s weekly 
and monthly newsletters received notable nationwide circulation, and the movement 
was seen almost solely as ‘Lee’s party’. 
- Criterion Met - 
Amount of Criteria Met 
5/6 
Conclusion 
Through the application of the three separate theories, Panizza and Laclau’s populism, 
Riker’s heresthetics, and Gustafson’s framework, it can be concluded that John A. Lee 
is a traditional populist, and closely fits Gustafson’s definition of a New Zealand 
populist leader. Lee formed a populist movement that focussed heavily on him as the 
operational leader of the movement who came to dominate it. Idolism of Lee by his 
followers closely matched the brief rise of his political party, and the party was shaped 
and defined by Lee’s personality and politics. Multiple examples were identified in this 
study of Lee, through both rhetoric and policy, dividing society into a ‘people’ and an 
‘other’; clear in- and out- groups. These included positions that were opposed to 
immigration, Maori land claims, as well as an anti-Catholic movement towards the end 
of Lee’s political career. Lee attacked the status quo and the political establishment 
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throughout his career, including inside his own party, both in government and in 
opposition. Through shared hardship and experience, particularly his military service, 
Lee could closely relate to many of his fellow citizens, who were damaged by an 
economic depression and war.  
Counter-examples that challenge the closeness of Lee to the Gustafson, Panizza and 
Laclau models of populism are few in Lee’s career, and only two examples of 
heresthetics were identified in this study: the successful strategic decisions of Lee’s 
time managing the state housing programme, and the unsuccessful heresthetics of the 
Democratic Soldier Labour Party’s 1943 general election campaign. 
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Chapter Four – Case Study: Winston Peters 
Introduction 
In this chapter, Peters’ political biography will be canvassed, and the competing theory 
strands of this study will be applied to key events and decisions made by him. Little 
biographical work has been undertaken in relations to Peters, but the study is grateful 
for the compilation of sources formed by Dr. Bryce Edwards of Otago University in his 
excellent series of posts on his liberation website.205 It is hypothesised that Peters will 
closely resemble the populist leader described by Panizza and Laclau, while he will 
meet only some criteria of Riker’s heresthetic leader theorem, and only on a limited 
number of occasions.  
Peters appears to be the leader Gustafson envisioned when crafting his six point 
criteria of New Zealand populist leadership, and this chapter will both reinforce the 
validity of this claim, and offer wider insights into Peters’ populism. Peters, as the only 
of the case studies who can be accurately categorised by Gustafson’s six point criteria, 
presents this study with a unique opportunity to test the depth of the framework in 
explaining populism leadership. These insights will include the fundamental divisions of 
social groups as explained by Panizza and Laclau, and previously unclear examples of 
Peters employing, or attempting to employ, heresthetics. 
Early Life 
Winston Raymond Peters was born on the 11th of April 1945 to a Scottish mother, Joan, 
and a Maori father, Len, the middle child of 11 in the Peters family of Whananaki.206 
The family belonged to the Ngati Wai iwi, meaning ‘the people of the sea’. Named after 
Winston Churchill, he had a typical northern Maori childhood, working on the land and 
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attending the small local school.207 His father was a carpenter and a worker in the 
freezing works, while the Peters boys, of which there are 7, milked the cows before 
and after school. After his parents had run out of money to put him through boarding 
school in Auckland, Winston was sent to Whangarei Boys High School.208  
After completing a teaching diploma in Auckland, Winston taught for one year before 
enrolling in a BA in History and Political Science at Auckland University. His 
independent streak and his pride were on show at this early stage, as he refused 
scholarships and other assistance available to him, preferring to work to pay for his 
study, including work on the docks, at a freezing works, as a waiter, and many other 
odd jobs.209 Attracted by the promise of good money for hard work, Peters went to 
Australia in 1969 to work as a blast furnace worker for BHP in Newcastle, and then into 
the mines at Snowy Mountain.210 
His ambition once again took hold as he set his sights on becoming a lawyer. He 
headed back to Auckland, and upon arriving at Auckland University to enrol, was told 
he was too late. Peters went straight to the Dean of the Law School and argued his 
case, persuading him to let him enrol.211 He graduated in 1974, and was known 
amongst his peers as an average student, but one with great application, particularly 
under pressure and at exam time. Peters joined the National Party in this period, 
because it was the party closest to his ‘philosophy of independence’.212 Peters was no 
student radical; rather, he was carefully dressed, prepared and respectful when 
speaking in university forums on political issues.213 As a young graduate, Peters worked 
for Russell McVeagh on the case of his own iwi, Ngati Wai, and a claim for their land 
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not to be taken for public recreational use. Peters practised law for eight years, and in 
this period made his first moves in the political world.214 
Peters stood as National’s candidate in the Maori seat of Northern Maori in 1975, one 
of the few political moves that placed Peters’ career trajectory closer to that of Maori 
politics, a domain that Peters has never embraced or accepted as part of his politics, 
but the only realistic proving ground for a young Maori politician in the National Party 
in 1975. This became an attack point for Peters’ opponents, with  his parliamentary 
nickname in his first terms being ‘Luigi’, which was either a stab at his good looks, and 
dress sense, or the re-emergence of a vehemently denied rumour that Peters 
pretended to be Italian rather than Maori at Auckland University, despite captaining 
the Auckland Maori rugby team.215 A very safe Labour seat held by Matiu Rata, 
Northern Maori was not expected to be the launching ground of Peters’ parliamentary 
career, but his campaigning skills were demonstrated when Rata’s majority was 
reduced by over 1000 votes, from a majority of 5260 votes over National in 1972, to a 
majority of 4151 over Peters in 1975 .216217  
Peters entered Parliament in 1979, following a bitter court battle over a contested 
election result in Hunua from the 1978 general election. Peters had lost on the night to 
Labour’s Malcolm Douglas, but he took the result to court, claiming that some Labour 
votes were invalid and fraudulent. The court eventually sided with Peters, giving him 
the seat and a majority of only 192 votes. Attacks from Labour were numerous after 
this result, and Peters’ bitterness towards his political opponents can be partially 
attributed to such a fraught start to his career: victory through the courtroom, 
requiring himself and his wife Louise to spend their savings in order to fight the legal 
battle.218 
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Peters launched his parliamentary career in 1979 with his maiden speech, with a 
notable line criticising those who “exploit every tremor and spasm in society, the 
economy or race relations, seeking to use every such event as a vehicle to project his 
own public personality”.219 This quote seems ironic, coming from the man many view 
as a close embodiment of the populist ideal, a crusading leader who built a movement 
in his image, fighting against the political establishment. 
In the 1981 election, Peters lost his Hunua seat, after a redrawing of the electorate 
moved 2000 voters from the urban Otara seat into Hunua. Peters returned to 
practising law, including setting up his own practice in Howick. In 1984 Peters stood for 
nomination in Kaipara, only to lose it to Lockwood Smith. As Muldoon had called a snap 
election, however, National needed a candidate in Tauranga and after an approach by 
local officials, Peters entered the contest. He threw himself into the process, and while 
only having a day and a night to work the delegates, he met every one and noted their 
reactions and preferences. After deciding he would win, he submitted his nomination 
just as the deadline closed, and entered a frantic election campaign. Peters’ 
campaigning skills were once again evident; on election night he won Tauranga, and 
had lifted National’s majority in the seat from 1800 to 4000.220 
Peters moved to Salamanca Road in Kelburn, into a flat with fellow National MPs Don 
McKinnon, Paul East and Philip Burdon. The flatmates became close friends while in 
opposition from 1984-1990, sharing one car between the four of them, and two of 
them sleeping in double beds in the lounge.221  
Theory Application 
Subsequent sections of this chapter will be dedicated to identifying events and 
decisions involving Winston Peters’ leadership that relate to the test theories of the 
study: traditional populist theory and heresthetics. If the hypotheses of the study are 
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accurate, Peters’ career will more closely follow the trajectory of the traditional 
understanding of populism, that of Panizza and Laclau. Examples will be identified that 
show the rise of Peters’ leadership to dominate a movement, as is consistent with 
Laclau’s theory, and the divisions of the electorate into in- and out- groups of the 
‘people’ and the ‘other’, as is consistent with Panizza’s theory.  
Traditional populist examples include Peters’ aggressive issue emphasis in his first spell 
in opposition, his accusations of corporate cronyism, the formation and positioning of 
New Zealand First, his return to populism after the collapse of the National-led 
coalition, his subsequent campaigns in opposition and his return to Parliament in 2011. 
These populist examples express, through the issue focus of New Zealand First, the 
active naming and dividing of society into in- and out- groups of a ‘people’ and an 
‘other’, with the ‘other’ broadly defined as big business, financiers, immigrants, Maori 
nationalists and Islam. Peters’ ‘people’ can be broadly viewed as New Zealand First’s 
voter base: older New Zealanders, pensioners, those who have felt betrayed by both 
National and Labour, and middle- to low- income voters in New Zealand’s provincial 
towns and cities. Heresthetic counter-examples are provided, both to illustrate the 
unseen aspects of his political personality, and to contrast their minimal number and 
lack of evidence-based depth in comparison to populist examples. These examples will 
include the strategy around entering into government with both National and Labour, 
and the decision to stay in opposition regardless of the result of the 2011 election. 
Aggressive Opposition 
In 1984, back in Parliament, Peters launched into the role of attack dog against the 
Labour Government, at a pace and frequency that was both impressive and concerning 
for his colleagues. He began to gain public approval for his scattergun approach to 
scandal, including demanding inquiries into ministerial renting of Wellington flats, 
scratches on the bottom of the Cook Strait ferry, Russian spying in New Zealand waters 
and the controversial sinking of the Mikhail Lermontov in 1986. Peters’ first major 
scandal and bout of publicity came in the domain of Maori politics, attacking the 
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Government over Maori privilege and excess, a particular lightning rod in heartland 
New Zealand. Peters attacked Maori Affairs Minister Koro Wetere and his 
department’s role in controversial Maori development contracts.222 Between 1984 and 
1987 Peters debated in the House for 200 more hours than any other member on 
these scandals.223  
Following the Fourth Labour Government’s re-election in 1987, Peters was joined on 
his staff by a young researcher named Michael Laws, and, armed with the newly 
enacted Official Information Act, stepped up his campaigns against corruption.224 While 
Laws was behind much of the direction, Peters gained serious traction in the public’s 
eyes with a series of attacks in the 1987-1990 parliamentary term, including more 
questionable Maori loans, attacking the race relations commissioner, and exposing 
dodgy business and Government PR deals.225 Laws attributes this heightened success 
to a new way of ‘packaging’ the scandals Peters found, in a way that allowed the media 
to easily understand, digest, and repeat them to the voting public.226 
Popularity came quickly to an increasingly confident Peters. As Peters’ profile grew, in 
contrast to stoic National Party leader Jim Bolger and the rapidly disintegrating Labour 
Government, he became the people’s choice for Prime Minister by mid-1990.227 Peters 
overtook Bolger as preferred Prime Minister in June 1988, Prime Minister Lange in 
March 1989, and in July 1990, with just over 20% support, overtook a briefly surging 
Geoffrey Palmer (who replaced Lange as Prime Minister in 1989) in election year.228 
Bolger was still odds-on to become Prime Minister in a landslide election win, but he 
wasn’t even the preferred Prime Minister inside his own party; from as early as June 
1988, 38% of National Party supporters wanted Peters as their leader.229  
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Peters had one chance to become National Party leader in this buoyant period; in 
August 1989, when a faltering National Party replaced its party President, rumours of a 
coup to unseat Bolger abounded as his approval ratings reached a new low and Labour 
received the boost of a newly stable leadership team. What saved Bolger was division 
in his backbench; Peters was estimated to have around 14 votes in a leadership bid, 
while neo-liberal firebrand Ruth Richardson was said to have garnered 10 if it went to a 
vote. Neither side’s backers could decide how each camp could combine their votes; 
the gap between populist Peters and liberal Richardson was too much to bridge and 
the personal distrust too great.230 In 1990, after this failed bid, Michael Laws saw that 
the only opportunity for Peters to become National leader was if Bolger retired after 
two terms, as the National Party was overly cautious and wary of change, particularly if 
a victory of the scale expected in 1990 occurred.231 
In Government 
Following National’s landslide victory in 1990; a campaign in which Peters had at times 
eclipsed his leader and attacked his own party’s economic policy, Peters found out 
from journalist Barry Soper that he had made it into Cabinet, ranked at number 17 and 
Minister of Maori Affairs.232 Peters decided to embrace his portfolio work with 
dedication, despite the low ranking and distrust in him held by the leadership. Peters 
formed a policy called Ka Awatea, a blueprint for solving Maoridom’s problems with 
uniquely Maori solutions.233 While Peters had begun to reconnect with the Maori 
community, his personal popularity dropped to 10% compared to Bolger’s 23%. 
In government, and lacking the populist issues on which to crusade, Peters was 
slipping. Crucially, Peters did not do the adequate groundwork on his policy and its 
preparation to Cabinet, and had not ensured his colleagues’ support. This problem was 
                                                          
230
 Booth, p. 54 
231
 Ibid. 
232
 McLeod, p. 48 
233
 Ibid. 
68 
 
to occur throughout his periods in government.234 Peters went to the media, stating 
that the government must accept his project, now heavily modified, or there was no 
need for a Minister or Ministry of Maori Affairs. After attending a meeting that had 
been sanctioned by Bolger, Peters’ policy was launched with little fanfare, and by 
October 1991 the underperforming Peters was sacked as Minister of Maori Affairs, as a 
result of poor public reaction to Ka Awatea, internal reaction in the Cabinet against Ka 
Awatea, and Peters’ method of promoting the policy directly to the media, over 
objections from Cabinet colleagues.235 Maori broadcaster Derek Fox provides an 
illuminating insight on this period in Peters’ career; “He was starting to succeed in 
Maori terms, which usually means you’re going to lose in Pakeha terms”.236 
Accusations of Crony Capitalism 
Peters moved quickly to try to regain the attention of the public. He rose to 
prominence again in early 1992, with attacks on the credibility of the government, and 
the emergence of a new populist issue.237 Peters attacked the financial deals related to 
the collapse of the Bank of New Zealand, and particularly the influence of investment 
firm Fay Richwhite, and the involvement of lobbyists from the Business Roundtable. 
Once again, Peters’ popularity and profile grew, despite being a backbencher in an 
increasingly unpopular government. The BNZ/Fay Richwhite controversy struck home 
with middle-New Zealanders hurt by successive rounds of economic reforms, and angry 
about the excessive wealth spent by such groups on the America’s Cup challenge while 
unemployment remained high.238  
With the message crafted by Laws, another key issue was advanced by Peters’ 
throughout his early time in parliament: proportional representation. By late 1992, 
commentators such as Glen Pettit from the Bay of Plenty Times observed that Peters 
could win his Tauranga seat in the event he either leaves or is kicked out of National, 
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and the soon-arriving change in electoral system, signalled by the 1993 non-binding 
referendum, could open up a new avenue to power for Peters.239  
While in Hastings to be the MC at Michael Laws’ wedding, Peters met with Selwyn 
Cushing, a wealthy businessman. Peters subsequently made a claim in Parliament that 
he had been offered a bribe by Cushing, whom Peters claimed was working for the 
Business Roundtable, to stop his attacks on the corporate elite. Laws saw this at the 
time as being reckless, a misunderstanding, or the result of a hangover from the night 
before.240 Peters eventually mentioned this claim outside of Parliament, forcing a libel 
suit from Cushing that cost Peters and his family a significant amount of money and 
time, and demonstrated a trait that has harmed Peters in his career: an at times 
reckless attitude towards attention to detail and planning.241 His old flatmates from 
Salamanca Road began to desert him, as his statements became increasingly anti-
National and anti-corporatist, and the situation of having a firebrand populist with 
growing support sitting on the backbenches became untenable for National. 
Expulsion 
In late 1992, Winston Peters was expelled from the National caucus on a vote of 50 to 
12, and despite briefly considering fighting for the National nomination in Tauranga, 
Peters saw that his political survival depended on the formation of a new political 
party.242 Peters’ popularity was boosted further by the expulsion, and he continued his 
crusade against big business and the BNZ deal. Intent on making a statement, Peters 
resigned from Parliament to seek a new mandate for himself as an independent 
member, winning the subsequent by-election in April 1993 with 90% of the vote, in a 
very weak field, made up of assorted low-profile independents.243 
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Now separated from National, behind the scenes discussions began on the formation 
of a new party. As early as August 1992, discussions shepherded by Laws began within 
National and the small Liberal Party244 regarding the formation of a ‘New National’ 
minor party to compete for the centre vote in the potential proportional system in 
New Zealand.245 Negotiations between the Alliance246 and Peters had begun in secret 
as early as December 1991, but several difficulties held back the probability of success; 
Peters was concerned with the multiple party structure of the grouping, the role of Jim 
Anderton, who dominated the movement, and the leftist tendencies of the majority of 
the party.247 The talks were ended in early July 1993 by the Alliance leadership, as 
Peters was not dedicated to the process, and strong public support was forming for a 
Peters’ led-party, up to 31% in one poll. 
New Zealand First – Populist Policy and Campaigning 
New Zealand First was launched at Alexandra Park raceway on Sunday the 18th of July 
1993, with a party logo in patriotic black and white, a policy platform that was mostly 
unformed and general, and steeped in populist rhetoric.248 The party’s position in the 
populist centre, in the image of its leader, became clear: an anti-establishment 
platform, formed around strong nationalism, policies to stop asset sales, restrictions on 
immigration (particularly from non-English speaking countries), and advocating direct 
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democracy and accountability.249 Thoroughly opposed to the neo-liberalism of 
successive Labour and National governments, and distrustful of big business, NZ First 
was able to draw support both from the left with its protectionist, Muldoonist 
economic platform, and from the right, with its illiberalism on race, Treaty issues, 
immigration, and ‘bludgers’ of the welfare, political and corporate variety.250  
While support for NZ First began at a high mark, polling before the 1993 general 
election had the party down to around 10%, hampered by an unclear policy platform 
and a lack of guiding principles. Laws commented that “I failed to detect a philosophy, 
a principle or even a defining policy that would flame the Peters personality into the 
kind of all-encompassing prairie populism needed to win a general election”.251 In the 
1993 election, New Zealand First gained a disappointing two seats, Peters in Tauranga 
and Tau Henare in Northern Maori, and 8.4% of the electorate votes across the 
country.252 The party campaign was unorganised, and Peters was hamstrung by the 
lockout of the party from state election funding and television air-time, instead having 
to campaign on the ground in each electorate.253 
Two major issues that are linked to Peters’ populism provided the spark for what was 
to come for New Zealand First in 1996: political and corporate cronyism and 
immigration. A complex conspiracy was beginning to emerge in the early 1990s 
surrounding tax avoidance in the Cook Islands, New Zealand merchant banks, the BNZ, 
Fay Richwhite (who had profited heavily from state asset sales), and the IRD. Winston 
Peters latched onto this issue, pitting his powerless ‘everyman’ against the powerful 
who had conspired to ‘rip off’ the New Zealander taxpayer. This was in the wider 
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societal context of the history of neo-liberal reforms advocated by the political and 
business elite, which were undertaken by both National and Labour, and held in 
contempt by much of working-class and middle New Zealand.254  
Peters tabled in Parliament the tax documents of tax haven shell company European 
Pacific, which were given to him as a tipoff in a Montana Winebox in early 1994.255 
Peters, whose finance sector credibility was bruised by what many commentators saw 
as ‘conspiracy theory ramblings’ involving the BNZ bailout of the previous three years, 
threw the issue into public profile. This forced the Government into a long running 
inquiry on the Winebox that provided a publicity platform for Peters and his lawyers 
throughout the 1990s, despite the findings ultimately being inconclusive.256  
In early 1996, New Zealand First was polling respectably, and Winston Peters was 
about to announce the party’s position on a policy issue that both sparked their 
election campaign, and became a defining issue for the party. Beginning with a State of 
the Nation speech on February 1st, in response the increasing levels of Asian migration 
to New Zealand in the 1990s, most notably in Auckland, Peters called for immigration 
to be ‘cut to the bone’. The policy limited arrivals to 10,000 per year, and the speech 
stated that immigrants were draining social service budgets, taking New Zealand jobs 
and driving up real estate prices out of the reach of the working New Zealander. 
Results were dramatic: a taboo subject avoided by the political establishment was used 
as a lightning rod to inflame middle-New Zealand’s resentment, particularly in the 
context of a de-regulated economy and the social dislocation of rapidly evolving 
industries and communities.257  
Within two months New Zealand First was closing in on National in the opinion polls, 
peaking at 29%, ahead of both Labour and the Alliance. New Zealand First entered the 
1996 election with high hopes of deciding the next government, with a populist 
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pipeline to the New Zealand heartland through their policy platform, and a link to the 
Maori community through Peters and particularly Tau Henare. New Zealand First 
pursued aggressive strategies to recruit winnable candidates in the Maori seats, 
sending a message of real political power for Maori in the first MMP election.258  
Low on funds due to a loan taken out to fund a professionalised bus tour for Peters, 
and a lack of large-scale fundraising capability as a result of his anti-corporate message, 
New Zealand First had significant organisational problems in the 1996 election 
campaign. There were controversies around the party list, and the wider party was 
disconnected from the parliamentary wing. In addition, the lack of funds meant the 
party couldn’t conduct internal polling, and a large amount of election material that 
was printed could not be distributed.259  
These factors, coupled with a drop in support following the initial surge earlier in the 
year, and an economic rationalisation of an unclear and financially untested manifesto, 
lessened the hopes of a second place finish for New Zealand First and Peters. On 
election night, New Zealand First won 13.35% of the vote, ahead of the Alliance on 
10.2%, but behind Labour on 28.19% and National on 33.87%. New Zealand First swept 
all the Maori seats, delivering a powerful new bloc to the party in parliament.260 New 
Zealand had undertaken its first MMP election, and the result delivered Peters and 
New Zealand First as kingmakers, able to choose Labour or National to become the 
Government.261 Commentators quickly began to anoint Labour’s Helen Clark as New 
Zealand’s first woman Prime Minister; the accepted wisdom was that Peters would not 
return to prop up the government that had expelled him, and the party that he had 
vigorously attacked.262 
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Peters led a small team to negotiate with National and Labour, a process that took 
seven weeks to complete. Commentators stated that Peters was unlikely to go into 
formal coalition with National; he would either go into coalition with Labour, or 
support a minority-National government issue by issue, and bring down the 
government and side with Labour and the Alliance if there was a severe policy 
disagreement. Amongst New Zealand First voters on polling day, 75% preferred Labour 
over National, and later polls throughout the negotiations put that number at 63%, and 
at 45% for a Labour deal versus 37% support for a National deal amongst all voters.263 
The National Coalition 
On the 10th of December 1996, in a televised speech to the nation, Peters gave his 
coalition decision. In dramatic fashion, at a time when he was arguably at the peak of 
his political power, Peters left announcement of the decision of his choice of a coalition 
partner until the last line of the speech; he would form a formal coalition government 
with National until 1999.264  
This decision was made for a variety of reasons: Peters was offered the new position of 
Treasurer, which appeared at the time to give him control of the Finance portfolio. This 
was something that Labour was not willing to do. In addition, members of the New 
Zealand First negotiating team, particularly Jack Elder, formerly a Labour MP, and Peter 
McCardle, a former National MP, found Labour’s team to be presumptuous and 
overconfident.265 Interestingly, in an interview in 2005, Peters blames Jim Anderton for 
scuttling the potential deal with Labour. Peters stated that Anderton sent a letter to 
Labour illustrating that the Alliance could not support New Zealand First on all issues of 
conscience, and would therefore have a veto power over New Zealand First in terms of 
supporting the potential governing arrangement. Peters could not fathom giving 
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Anderton such power, particularly from a party competing for the same anti-
establishment vote.266  
Peters himself has never stated his personal preference, but it could be argued that 
while the party left the Muldoonist, nationalistic and independent roots that drew 
Peters to National, Peters never truly left them. Faced with a choice of supporting an 
unpopular National government that had managed to win a plurality of the vote or a 
grouping on the centre-left with no dominant party, Peters may have returned to his 
roots, hoping to steer the government with his powerful influence. Peters also had a 
legitimate claim of choosing stability; by going with the party with the plurality of 
seats, his coalition had the highest mathematical chance of remaining cohesive 
throughout the parliamentary term.  
Tau Henare had made it clear to the party in the 1996 campaign that there was no way 
Bolger was going to be propped up as Prime Minister after the election, although 
Peters had reprimanded Henare for this statement, perhaps foreshadowing the 
decision. 
Heresthetics and the Coalition Decision 
Heresthetical analysis reveals that Peters may have had a long term focus to the 
coalition decision. Michael Laws reports of a conversation that took place between 
himself and Peters after the arrangement was finalised, in which Peters claimed he 
viewed the government as not just about getting to 1998 or 1999, but to actually 
continue as a real coalition in the mould of a merger of interests like the 
Liberal/National grouping in Australia.267  This can be viewed as an attempt by Peters 
to apply heresthetics to his political environment, positioning his party in a strategic 
location in which it would be guaranteed power and importance as part of a 
permanent coalition. Peters had not made the choice signalled by the populist 
campaign New Zealand First had run in 1996; instead, he made a decision of which the 
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political repercussions were certain, but, in his mind, the long term strategic 
opportunities were as well. This attempt to solidify power from a position of political 
strength was a clear, but unsuccessful, heresthetic gambit. The popularity and 
credibility of the party was heavily damaged despite potentially good intentions.  
As part of the coalition arrangement, National gave some policy concessions to Peters 
and New Zealand First – notably, increased spending on health, such as free health 
care for under sixes, higher education funding, some dialogue over immigration and 
overseas investment, and a promise to send the issue of compulsory superannuation 
(favoured by Peters) to a referendum.268 Peters believed that he had also extracted a 
great price from National for Government with the Treasurer role, but in practice 
National’s Finance Minister Bill Birch did much of the policy work, while Peters’ role 
was mostly symbolic. The voters expecting New Zealand First to move the 
government’s approach away from liberalisation were disappointed, as Peters’ first 
Budget in 1997 signalled the elimination of all tariffs and a lack of aversion to foreign 
investment. Tellingly, Laws stated that “Peters wanted the mana associated with the 
senior role rather than the role itself”.269 
Populist Revival 
By early 1998, support for Peters and New Zealand First had slumped to the low single 
digits, with a TVNZ/Colmar Brunton Poll showing the party at 2 percent and Peters at 3 
percent as preferred Prime Minister in April.270 Peters attempted a revival of his 
fortunes by calling himself ‘the People’s Treasurer’, and pointing to the gains his party 
has made while in Coalition, particularly the removal of the superannuation surtax. 
National had promised to remove the surtax as part of the 1990 manifesto, but failed 
to do so while in Government in 1990-1996. Peters campaigned on this issue 
                                                          
268
 Nick Venter, ‘A contradictory populist’, in The Dominion, 15 August 1998, p. 27 
269
 Laws, Demon Profession, p. 387 
270
 Helen Bain, ‘Peters the populist is back’, in The Dominion, 14 April 1998, p. 6 
77 
 
throughout the mid-1990s, and ultimately removed the surtax through policy 
negotiation with National as part of the Coalition.271  
Peters also found a potent populist issue in the payment of pensions to war veterans 
damaged by exposure to French nuclear testing in the Pacific while on observation 
duties; the issue had been ignored by the two major parties, and Peters targeted it as 
an injustice wrought by the establishment onto the populace, and through his 
influence and his position, he was able to secure the payments.272 By this point Jenny 
Shipley had become Prime Minister after replacing Jim Bolger in a leadership coup in 
1997, and Peters’ relationship with his superior was poor, lacking the personal 
connection that had developed between himself and Bolger despite their long-held 
differences and rivalries. By August 1998, Peters was sacked as Treasurer, over 
opposition to the Government’s plan to privatise Wellington Airport, after a tense 
period in which Peters publically moved away from the increasingly right wing program 
that he had originally signed off on when appointed Treasurer.273  
A clash and separation was inevitable as Peters faced the reality of an electorate 
moving against National, the low poll results of New Zealand First, and the association 
of his cabinet position with the unpopular economic programme. The public’s 
perception of the wider New Zealand First party was severely damaged in this period, 
particularly following actions by some of the Maori MPs in the party, known as the 
‘Tight Five’. A scandal involving Aotearoa Television, which received state funding, 
having its funds used by NZ First MP Tuku Morgan on expensive items of clothing, was 
the type of political spending scandal that can damage the public perception of a party, 
particularly one claiming to be fighting against the greed of the entrenched political 
and business elite.274 
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While obtaining some notable policy gains while in coalition with National, the 
Treasurer position, in the words of journalist Nick Venter, proved to be Peters’ 
downfall.275 An increasingly unpopular Shipley-led National government continued, 
held together by the votes of independent MPs who had split off a directionless New 
Zealand First, and an independent ex-Alliance Maori MP. Facing low poll numbers, 
blamed for creating the conditions for the formation of an unpopular government, and 
in third place in polling on election night in 1999, Peters and New Zealand First faced 
electoral oblivion. Labour, the Alliance and the Greens had made peace and New 
Zealand was heading towards a decisive victory for the left. With little money and 
structure remaining in the party, Peters led a valiant effort of retail campaigning, 
stumping up and down the country, and by the slimmest of margins managed to save 
his party from complete defeat. New Zealand First dropped below the 5% threshold 
once the votes were counted, finishing on 4.26%, but Peters saved the party by 
winning the Tauranga seat by only 63 votes.276 A term on the opposition benches 
beckoned, in the position which Peters was most familiar with - attacking a 
government. 
Return to Populist Opposition 
In Parliament with a reduced caucus of 5 MPs, and with a Labour-led coalition 
government in power, Peters was able to refocus his efforts on a specific plank of 
populist issues that would resonate with his electorate, particularly those who were 
conservative but did not hold a desire to return a splintered National Party to power.  
Peters’ main focus was the issue that had sparked his party’s surge to the lead of the 
opinion polls in the mid-1990s: immigration. He once again criticised the level of 
immigration in New Zealand, particularly Asian migrants, blaming them for rising house 
prices, an increased cost of living, and high interest rates.277 The other two sections of 
NZ First’s platform were a tough law and order policy, and a pledge to end the ‘Treaty 
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of Waitangi grievance industry’, to provide one law for all,278 making a stark contrast 
with the progressive and liberal government. Prime Minister Helen Clark called an early 
election in June 2002, after internal strife in the Alliance party over the Afghanistan 
War lead to uncertainty of the stability of the Alliance in the coalition. Labour also held 
a strong lead in political opinion polls, further strengthening Prime Minister Clark’s 
position. The election was held on 27 July 2002, and Peters was able to drum up 
support for the three key policies of New Zealand First’s platform, with a campaign 
slogan of ‘Can we fix it? Yes we can’.  
The short election campaign, a poorly run effort by National, the high popularity of the 
Prime Minister and the realisation in the final weeks that Labour was very likely to win 
collapsed National’s vote as swing voters searched for moderating coalition partners 
for Labour.279 The rise of the moderate United Future party on the back of a strong 
debate performance by MP and party leader Peter Dunne gave Clark choice post-
election, marginalising Peters’ chances of being kingmaker in the style of 1996. From 
this position, Clark was able to rule out the increasingly divisive Peters during the 
campaign. Peters nevertheless romped home in Tauranga, and his party received 
10.38% of the party vote, delivering 13 seats, as National’s vote collapsed to an all-time 
low of 20.93%.280 A new government was formed involving Labour, the Progressives 
(ex-Alliance leader Jim Anderton’s new party), and United Future, with the Greens 
spurned due to disagreements over Labour’s genetic engineering policy. Peters and his 
party were placed in a strong position in Opposition to make gains in a crowded field. 
Message discipline was the focus of New Zealand First in opposition, and a strong focus 
was given to the three messages Peters pushed during the 2002 election campaign. 
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Regularly polling strongly, New Zealand First found momentum in opposition, and 
remained on course to once again be a player in New Zealand politics.   
New National Party leader Don Brash altered this dynamic with his game-changing 
Orewa address on race relations in 2004, in which he attacked separatism and Treaty 
grievance in New Zealand, calling for “one law for all”. An immediate and 
unprecedented poll bounce for National occurred,281 with one of Peters’ key policy 
positions now taken up by a party with more outreach, funds and media coverage, in a 
move that Peters’ called “theft of someone else’s intellectual property”.282 New 
Zealand First went into the 2005 campaign emphasising 5 issues – the same three from 
2002; and an additional emphasis on caring for seniors, notably through the Super Gold 
Card subsidy scheme and raising the superannuation rate, and a renewed call for 
economic nationalism and retention of New Zealand control of assets and exports.283 In 
the tense global environment post 9/11 and the Bali bombings, Peters raised concerns 
over Muslim radicals residing in New Zealand, emphasising media stories that had been 
reported over a long period, claiming that there was a militant Muslim underbelly in 
New Zealand hiding behind a moderate facade.284 Peters again raised the spectre of 
Asian immigration in 2005 with an address at Orewa stating that they were bringing 
‘imported criminal activity’ to New Zealand. 
By June/July 2005, New Zealand First was polling around 10% in the major opinion 
polls, a strong performance considering the media focus on the two major parties, and 
the policy positioning of National.285 New Zealand First advisor Damian Edwards stated 
that this was seen in the party as a stepping stone to a 20% performance on election 
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night.286 Traction in the campaign was made on seniors policy; however the framing of 
the entire election debate around tax, particularly the small tax cut offered by Labour 
and the large, broad cuts offered by National, marginalised New Zealand First, which 
emphasised its core issues rather than macroeconomic policy.287  
On election night, New Zealand First’s support dropped to 5.72%, and Peters lost his 
Tauranga seat to wealthy local businessman Bob Clarkson.288 This drop can be 
attributed to the loss of anti-National voters concerned that in a close election New 
Zealand First could once again support a National government, and a concerted charm 
offensive by the Labour government to emphasis their success in delivering policy 
outcomes for seniors.289 
In the election campaign, Peters had given a speech in Rotorua signalling that he would 
support, as government,  the party with the most seats, would not be part of a 
government with the Greens, and that he would eschew the ‘baubles of office’.290 
Following the election, the close result of Labour, with 50 seats and National, with 48, 
meant that a Government arrangement wasn’t immediately clear, and overtures were 
made by National to United Future and the Maori Party. Peters, however, stuck to his 
word, and went with Labour, once again keeping the Greens out of Ministerial 
positions, in accepting the Foreign Affairs Ministerial position, outside of Cabinet, 
Peters was viewed by many as having broken his word, accepting the type of “bauble” 
he had promised not to take.291 
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Government with Labour 
The following parliamentary term was tough for Peters and New Zealand First. 
Significant policy gains were made, as they were in 1996-1998, in the form of the Super 
Gold Card subsidy, the raising of the superannuation payment rate, and the 
establishment of KiwiSaver, passed with New Zealand First’s confidence and supply 
votes, as a step towards the compulsory super scheme that Peters had always 
championed.292 
Personal triumphs for Peters were also evident; he grew into the role of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, becoming an adept statesman, through improving bilateral relations 
with the United States and a significant increase in the country’s diplomacy budget, 
foreign aid and trade outreach.293 Peters had never before performed well in 
Government, as his combative, anti-establishment persona runs counter to consensus 
decision making, but his time as Minister was scandal-free, even allowing a free trade 
agreement with China to be signed over his personal objections.  
A growing political donations scandal embroiled Peters and the party near the end of 
the parliamentary term. Amidst intense media pressure, and Serious Fraud Office, 
Police and Parliamentary Privileges Committee investigations, Peters was forced to 
stand down from his position.294 While eventually being cleared of any wrongdoing in 
the former two investigations, and receiving a censure from Parliament in the latter, 
the relentless negative media coverage took its toll on New Zealand First’s election 
chances.295 
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2008 Election Platform 
At the 2008 election campaign, Peters, still combative and energetic, took to the 
country himself, pushing his party’s election message of ‘Protect and Save your New 
Zealand’,296 with minimal positive media coverage. The party platform focussed on 
economic nationalism, and protecting the gains made by New Zealand First, such as 
KiwiSaver and the Super Gold Card.297 Campaign strategist Damian Edwards wrote that 
the killer blow to the New Zealand First campaign came when National leader John Key 
ruled out New Zealand First as a possible coalition partner, leaving next to no margin of 
error for the party, at that time polling in the low single digits.298 This eliminated the 
chance of voters wanting a change of government from the increasingly unpopular and 
embattled Labour administration giving their vote to New Zealand First to provide a 
moderating influence in a new coalition. Despite the myriad challenges, the party still 
defied the polls by receiving 4.07% of the vote.299 Out of parliament, with Peters 
trounced by National rising star Simon Bridges in Tauranga, the party vowed to 
continue and take its messaging directly to the people in the coming three years, 
buoyed by the fact that New Zealand First’s result was the fourth highest in terms of 
party vote in 2008.300 
Populist Rebuild of New Zealand First 
Following the 2008 election, Peters and New Zealand First rebuilt the party behind the 
scenes for the first year of the 49th Parliament,301 with few public statements until 
debate began on the Government’s replacement legislation for the Foreshore and 
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Seabed Act, a law that put contested areas of the coastline in Crown control, in 
opposition to Maori land claims. The original law was one that Peters supported and 
voted for, and he stood against the new bill, releasing statements and doing media 
interviews repeating his “one law for all” stance and attacking the “Treaty industry”. 
Peters was filling a niche in politics that had been abandoned by National since John 
Key’s repositioning of the party.302 Peters claimed the party retained a sizeable 
membership, and New Zealand First began gaining more visibility when the National 
Party announced its 2011 election policy of partial asset sales,  giving Peters fertile 
electoral ground for his brand of economic nationalism.303 His speeches and addresses 
to town halls and community meetings, which drew significant crowds for a party 
outside Parliament,304 focussed on several points: the failure of neo-liberal economics, 
the danger of social dislocations due to the breakdown of communities, the excessive 
wealth of the rich and powerful, the deregulated finance industries and a continued 
call for “one law for all”. The de-emphasis of immigration as an issue was notable and 
important; the party had been characterised by a policy that was perceived as being 
reactionary, and the stigma of racism was absent from an issue platform that focussed 
on economic populism. 
New Zealand First began to gain more media coverage from its 2011 campaign 
launch,305 and poll results, which Peters regularly attacked as being unreliable and 
untrustworthy, showed NZ First inching toward the 5% threshold.306 The National Party 
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held a large lead over Labour, and disaffected Labour and anti-National voters needed 
a new political home to place their frustrations, and to provide an alternative voice 
against the unpopular asset sales platform National was proposing. A political factor 
complicated this, however; National had again ruled out Peters as a potential coalition 
partner,307 reducing the party’s potential voter base. Political in 2011 pundits had all 
but written off New Zealand First.  
Heresthetics in the 2011 Campaign 
In an attempt to ameliorate the political damage of National’s ruling out of New 
Zealand First, Peters made an address in Kelston, in which a stance was announced 
that ruled out going into government with either major party; instead, NZ First would 
vote issue by issue from a position of opposition. This gave New Zealand First an 
increased chance of returning to Parliament, opening up the potential for conservative 
voters who did not want to elect a Labour government to vote for the party.308 This 
was an effective strategic movement: an example of Peters playing heresthetical 
offense from a position out of power, altering the previous repercussions around 
voting for New Zealand First to a multidimensional field. Removing fixed 
dimensionality, and enabling conservative voters who were opposed to asset sales to 
vote for a party that would not support Labour, would provide aggressive opposition, 
and would prevent National from gaining an outright majority, meaning that the now 
complex range of voting options allowed Peters to make a last minute push for these 
voters. Unlike past heresthetic manoeuvres by Peters, this decision was highly 
successful, as it laid the electoral platform for the party’s return to parliament.  
2011 Campaign 
Four very separate outside occurrences altered this dynamic, providing the platform 
for an unlikely comeback. Firstly, Labour proposed increasing the retirement age to 67 
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in increments starting in 2020, giving Peters a platform to vigorously oppose a policy 
seen as attacking a natural constituency for him, the elderly.309 Secondly, increasing 
coverage for Peters, and dissatisfaction with Labour, brought New Zealand First up to 
2.9% in a TVNZ/Colmar Brunton poll, judged to be high enough by TVNZ criteria to let 
Peters into the nationally televised minor party leaders’ debate,310 an event from 
which the party was previously scheduled to be excluded. Peters, in a commanding and 
measured performance, won the debate in the eyes of most commentators.311 Thirdly, 
the ‘teapot tape’ scandal gave Peters a new issue in which to establish a media 
presence. Prime Minister John Key and ACT candidate John Banks, whom Key was 
tacitly endorsing for the seat of Epsom in order to provide a lifeline to the damaged 
ACT Party – one of National’s coalition partners -  were secretly taped at their public 
meeting in an Auckland cafe. The contents of the tape were controversial, and made 
their way to Peters. Crucially, Key was said to have been disparaging to elderly New 
Zealand First supporters, and Peters used this in a campaign speech, providing two 
days of media coverage in which he was able to advance the New Zealand First’s wider 
platform.312 Finally, the use by the ‘Vote for Change’ anti-MMP campaign of Peters’ 
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image on their election advertising, in an attempt to disparage the current electoral 
system, provided a visual link to many more New Zealanders than his party could 
financially afford to reach.313  
The last days of the 2011 campaign showed a surge in the polls for New Zealand First 
to over the 5% party vote threshold.314 On election night, Labour’s vote dropped below 
most predictions to 27%, and New Zealand First surged up to 6.8%.315 The party and 
Peters were back in Parliament, having stormed home in the more conservative 
regional cities; gaining second in the party and electorate votes in Peters’ old seat of 
Tauranga, and registering a strong third in the party vote in the Bay of Plenty and 
Whanganui.316  
Idolism 
The populist movement associated with New Zealand First has always been sustained 
by the popularity and presence of Winston Peters. Laclau states that the decisive 
moment in the formation of a populist movement often comes when a populist leader, 
who actively constitutes such an expression of populism, rises in the political sphere. 
Peters’ early rise to political prominence as a National MP, following a series of 
explosive scandals and high profile clashes with the political and business elite, framed 
the populism that would emerge around Peters, to be heavily focussed on the leader 
rather than the movement itself. Since the formation of New Zealand First, Peters has 
been its only leader, and the party’s fortunes have risen on his high preferred Prime 
Minister ratings, the scandals he has uncovered, and the populist issues he has 
emphasised that have gone untouched by the political establishment. The party’s 
fortunes have also fallen when Peters has been involved in his own scandals, and when 
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tenures in government for New Zealand First have removed aspects of anti-
establishment rhetoric from the party’s political platform. The focus on Peters, 
including his likeness on all election material throughout the campaigns contested by 
the party, and the lack of other publically prominent members of New Zealand, has left 
the party in danger of relying so heavily on Peters’ idolism that, at this juncture, it 
seems unlikely that it could survive his eventual retirement. 
At present, following the 2011 election, Peters is back in his natural proving ground of 
opposition: master of inquiries, scandal and sensation, ready to oppose and propose, 
champion of the ‘people’, and already seen by some as a de facto Leader of the 
Opposition. 
The Gustafson Framework and Winston Peters 
Through the analysis of Winston Peters’ political career, and the application of Panizza 
and Laclau’s traditional populism and Riker’s heresthetics, it is clear that Peters is 
significantly more a pure populist than a heresthetician. This was demonstrated by the 
identification of key events and decisions made by Peters that fit Panizza and Laclau’s 
theories, which outweighed the number of heresthetic manoeuvres that could be 
identified. As was the case with John A. Lee, it is predicted that an application of 
Gustafson’s model of populist political leadership will show that Peters is accurately 
described by Gustafson’s theory. Peters appears to be the very leader Gustafson had 
envisioned when crafting his model and this theory application will attempt to 
demonstrate that. This will be tested by systematically applying each of Gustafson’s six 
criteria to Peters. The application is a critical reading of the previous discussions, and 
does not draw from new sources; instead, it draws from the empirical evidence found 
in the political biography material.  
The Six Criteria 
1. The leader claims to know what ‘ordinary’ people desire and believe, in contrast to 
corrupted and ignorant political parties and leaders of the established elite.  
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Peters’ politics, in the tradition of other populist conservatives such as Sir Robert 
Muldoon, closely fits the paradigm of ‘the people’ against a large and entrenched 
‘other’ of elites in politics and society. Peters has demonstrated this through his 
rhetoric, his attacks on privilege and power, and most importantly through the issues 
he has focussed on. Peters has been willing to raise controversial issues, including 
Asian immigration, the danger of Islam in New Zealand, and the problems of the Maori 
renaissance. National and Labour have been reluctant to raise such issues, due to risk 
of being labelled racist or offensive. Peters’ great political successes, including deciding 
who would govern in 1996, have stemmed from his attacks on the established elite. 
- Criterion Met - 
2. The leader draws their support from the marginalised and out-of-power, particularly 
during recession and rapid change.  
Some of the first wave of support for Peters and New Zealand First in the mid 1990s 
can be attributed to the anger of a section of the electorate damaged by the neo-
liberal reforms of both National and Labour. Skewing to an older demographic, and 
mostly in the regional centres, this voting bloc had experienced the loss of entire 
industries, a fundamentally changing and increasingly diverse New Zealand society, the 
upheaval of their workplace relations, and most importantly, a loss of trust. 
The consecutive political hairpin turns of 1987 and 1990, where Labour and National 
both implemented a fundamentally different policy platform from what they promised 
on the campaign trail, fuelled Peters’ rise. The support of this section of society that 
felt that the political establishment was completely contemptuous of them and their 
concerns, and had become untrustworthy, led to New Zealand First and Peters’ peak in 
1996. Despite losing much of his outsider credibility in separate terms as a Minister in 
National and then Labour governments, since returning to Parliament in 2011 Peters 
has continued in this vein, promising to be a voice for those ignored by elites.  
- Criterion Met – 
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3. The leader is anti-elitist, and sees hidden agendas behind decisions that affect 
business and government, that are detrimental to the ‘silent majority’.  
Peters’ career has been built on scandals in this vein. His popularity has peaked when 
going around the traditional government and media-driven storylines to push issues 
such as the relationship between the government and big business in the Winebox 
case, and the closeness between those who sold state assets in the 1980s and 1990s 
and those who purchased them. His attacks on Asian immigration in the mid 1990s 
challenged both major parties on an issue he believed the public felt strongly about - 
an immigration policy that Peters believed was detrimental to the cultural and social 
fabric of New Zealand, enacted to support a cosy relationship between employers and 
government. Peters is in his element when identifying a previously hidden conspiracy 
that involves actors attempting to hide the truth from the general population. 
- Criterion Met - 
4. The leader is nationalistic, inward looking and opposed to foreign ‘meddling’ or 
investment. This can sometimes be ethnocentric and racist. Immigration is a common 
issue in which a ‘them-us’ divide is forged.  
As a National MP of the Muldoon school, since his early career Peters has been 
opposed to foreign ownership of state assets and has made calls for restrictions on 
immigration. Uniquely, despite being of Maori heritage, Peters has also won the 
support of many who believe that the elite consensus around Maori development that 
began in the 1980s is hurting New Zealand, and that the development of separate 
institutions has forged a divide in society. The politics of envy conjured by Peters’ 
attacks on the wealth and trappings of Asian migrants in the 1990s proved electorally 
successful, and helped New Zealand First reach its peak of public popularity. 
Subsequent terms have been bookended by a consistent position against asset sales, 
under both Labour and National Governments, with the recent 2011 campaign 
dominated by criticism of proposed asset sales, the reckless nature of finance 
companies, and foreign ownership of New Zealand. 
91 
 
- Criterion Met - 
5. The leader uses a simplified nostalgia to hark back to a ‘Golden Age’ of prosperity 
and security.  
Peters’ rhetoric and campaign images have consistently referred to New Zealand as 
being great in the past tense, recalling times of prosperity and security. Peters often 
links the loss of this Golden Age - which is generally agreed to be the long period of 
political, social and economic stability before the last terms of the Muldoon 
government - to the rise of a neo-liberal grouping of big business, Maori interests, 
foreign investment, immigration and liberal elites, looking to deny the people their 
New Zealand. Campaign images have used the flag and patriotic images of war and 
struggle as symbols of this nostalgic New Zealand.  
- Criterion Met - 
6. The leader is the operational leader of the movement, section or party but comes to 
embody it publically.  
From Peters’ time as a popular National backbencher and shadow cabinet 
spokesperson, popularity has sought him, and he has sought it. Focussing his energies 
on government scandal and issues the establishment in National and Labour were 
unwilling to raise, Peters rose to high prominence in his party, eclipsing his leader at 
times in preferred Prime Minister polls. Peters and National became increasingly 
intertwined, much to the chagrin of those high in the party leadership, who saw Peters 
as a dangerous rabble-rouser. As Peters and National parted ways when in office, the 
formation of New Zealand First finally provided a political vehicle that could hold and 
encapsulate Peters’ personality and worldview. Since its formation, the success and 
failure of the party has largely rested on Peters’ shoulders, with few notable fellow 
MPs. Throughout New Zealand First’s election campaigns, Peters alone has been the 
main feature, and the party would be unlikely to survive without its only leader. 
- Criterion Met - 
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Amount of Criteria Met 
6/6 
Conclusion 
While Winston Peters is the ideal candidate for Gustafson’s criteria of a New Zealand 
populist leader, as demonstrated by this study of his political career, improvements 
can be made to the wider understanding of his brand of populism. Through application 
of populist and heresthetic theory, it is clear that Peters, more than any other of the 
case study leaders, is a quintessential populist. Peters’ leadership closely matches the 
theoretical path explored by Panizza and Laclau, and this explanation of active naming 
of a ‘people’ and an ‘other’, coupled with the movement-defining rise of Laclau’s 
populist leader, helps us understand how Peters’ leadership was formed, and identifies 
the theoretical and cultural basis for the design of the Gustafson model.  While 
demonstrating some heresthetic traits, the small number of these examples and their 
fleeting half-life in Peters’ career indicates that the traditional thinking and the New 
Zealand-specific approach of Gustafson was accurate in attributing the label of populist 
to Winston Peters. Peters is a true populist - railing against the establishment, defining 
society into a large ‘people’ against a changing but defined, ‘other’, nationalistic, 
nostalgic, idolized, distrustful of outside groups, and drawing support from the 
marginalized. 
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Chapter Five – Case Study: Richard Seddon, ‘King Dick’ 
Introduction 
Premier Richard Seddon, known as ‘King Dick’ by both friends and detractors by the 
end of his tenure, has the singular honour of being preserved in effigy in front of New 
Zealand’s Parliament. His legacy is far reaching; he came to embody the State while 
Premier, and his presence in statue has come to signify the power and authority of 
government in New Zealand.  
An academic consensus exists on the central importance of Seddon’s Liberal 
government in the formation of the modern New Zealand state. What has not been 
thoroughly examined is what the driving force behind Seddon’s leadership was; while 
being identified by historians as an example of personality-driven leadership and 
political idolatry, this study will challenge these preconceptions by analysing Seddon’s 
reign in the context of clashing theoretical frameworks of popular movements.  The 
chapter is informed by the biographical research conducted by David Hamer and 
Randall Mathews Burdon. 
Seddon will be viewed through the twin prisms of traditional populist theory and social 
choice heresthetics, and be found to be a hybrid of the two approaches to populist 
governance. The analysis of Seddon through Gustafson’s six point framework finds that 
he meets most, but not all, of Gustafson’s criteria for a populist leader.   
Seddon is the bridge in the wider study, a leader whose deep grounding in the ordinary 
life, aspirations and prejudices of his electorate is fused with a strategic mastery of his 
wider legislative and political environment.  This mastery meant that his opponents 
were denied victory and his popular coalition remained stable. Seddon is the populist 
heresthetician - a politician who was both fully conscious of his strategic placement 
and where to place others, while still adopting genuine populist positions regarding the 
elite, the old establishment, and those deemed to be outside of the ‘people’. 
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Through a reading of his career, the case will be made that Seddon is the sole example 
in this study that fits both theoretical models, and thus constitutes a stark example of a 
need to provide a broader framework for the understanding of populism in the wider 
academic literature. 
Early Life 
Born in 1845 in Lancashire, son of a headmaster and a teacher, Richard Seddon was a 
restless child.317 Removed from school at 12 due to not being academically inclined, 
Seddon worked on his grandfather’s farm until he was 14, when a falling out saw him 
become an apprentice at the local iron foundry.318 He worked there and at the 
Vauxhall Foundry in Liverpool until he was 18, when he lost the latter job after 
contracting smallpox, although he did manage to leave with an engineers’ certificate. 
Seddon left for the Australian goldfields in 1863, first working in government railway 
workshops, and then unsuccessfully prospecting in Bendigo. Traits that would serve 
him well in New Zealand were first observed upon his return to the workshops: 
including his notable physical strength and his speaking on behalf of a political 
candidate to his workmates.319 
West Coaster 
Seddon left for Hokitika in February 1866, having become engaged to Louisa 
Spotswood in Melbourne, but unable to marry as her family would not approve of the 
union until his career improved.320 He followed an uncle to Waimea to dig for gold, and 
made a decent living applying his engineering experience to irrigation of the fields.321 
Seddon opened his first trading stores at this time, most notably at Big Dam, turning a 
profit and enabling him to marry Louisa and settle down on the West Coast. Business 
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slowed, so Seddon gained a publican’s license for the store, and quickly became a 
larger than life community figure.322 
Politics and debate came to him easily, as a man always ready for a fight, both 
metaphorically and literally.323 Seddon was elected to the Arahura Road Board in 1870, 
became its chairman in 1872, and was elected to the Westland Provincial Council for 
Arahura in 1874. In 1876 he showed his determination by being elected and becoming 
chairman of the Westland County Council after two failed runs.324 Seddon flexed his 
legal muscles by representing miners in work disputes, and moved to the new 
goldfields at Kumara in 1876, establishing the Queen’s Hotel there. He made his first 
run for Parliament that year, coming fourth in Hokitika.325 The new settlement 
flourished, with Seddon’s hotel the centre of social life and debate, and in this context 
he became its first Mayor in 1877. Business for his hotel, butchery and store ebbed and 
flowed, and Seddon was forced to sell parts of his small empire and rely more on his 
legal work. Undeterred by his earlier loss, Seddon ran for and won Hokitika in 1879.326 
Parliament 
Beginning his career as a supporter of Premier George Grey, Seddon quickly became 
known for his long winded speeches (including 19 pages of Hansard for his maiden 
speech)327 and his loud speaking style, for which he apologised ‘on account of his 
provincial accent’328 after receiving negative reactions from unimpressed colleagues. 
His hometown, Kumara, became part of the new mining seat of Kumara in 1881, and as 
a strong miner’s advocate Seddon held this seat from 1881 to 1890.329 Notable in this 
period for being a parochial local member, and a great filibusterer, Seddon stayed 
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away from the larger policy debates of the 1880s, such as the Vogel loan programme. 
This ceased when Seddon voted with the government to support centralisation, in 
order to attain new spending for the West Coast region, previously starved of funds 
and public works.330 
Liberal Government 
By the 1890 election, party politics were in their early beginnings as Seddon (as part of 
a larger group) began to form the Liberal Party under John Ballance’s leadership. 
Winning the new Westland seat in 1890 on the back of strong support for a maritime 
strike, Seddon became a Minister upon the formation of the Liberal government in 
1891, responsible for Public Works, Mines and Defence.331 While still under attack for 
his verbose and brash style, Seddon took the populist style developed in West Coast 
mines, hotels and pubs around New Zealand, and connected with new voters and 
communities that did not know him, hearing their entreaties for public works. Hamer 
notes that in this period Seddon learned something crucial to the heresthetic art of his 
dominant premiership: the ‘art of giving away very little while flattering his 
audience’.332 
Ballance became seriously ill in 1892, and Seddon’s colleagues elected him caretaker 
leader over Liberal Party colleague William Pember Reeves. Seddon was subsequently 
elected to this position permanently following Ballance’s death in April 1893. Ballance 
was said to have endorsed the prohibitionist Sir Robert Stout as his replacement, but 
the pace of his illness prevented arrangements being made, as Stout had resigned from 
Parliament to return to his law practice.333 In June 1893, following Stout’s return to 
Parliament in a by-election, Seddon was reconfirmed as leader, and would soon 
critically outmanoeuvre his rival on one of the most prominent issues of the time.  
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Theory Application 
It is theorised that Seddon’s career will contain examples of both heresthetic strategy 
in the style of Riker, and populist positioning as found in the Panizza and Laclau 
schools.  
Five examples in which Seddon exercised heresthetics will be canvassed, and four 
examples of political positioning and rhetoric that indicates a traditional populist 
disposition will be discussed. Together these examples demonstrate a heresthetician 
grounded in the language and heritage of a populist leader. The heresthetic examples 
of Seddon’s leadership are: strategy around women’s suffrage, land and labour policy, 
his handling of prohibition, pork barrel politics and nepotism, and the old age pension 
debate. Populist examples will include Seddon’s creation of in- and out- groups of the 
‘people’ and the ‘other’ in the style of Panizza and Laclau, immigration policy and 
rhetoric, excursions into imperialism, the rise of his idolism, and Seddon’s closeness to 
his countrymen, their values and their prejudices. 
Women’s Suffrage 
By May 1893 Seddon had confirmed that he would carry out the Ballance legislative 
plan that was in place before his death.334 Movements to give women the vote began 
in New Zealand in the 1880s, notably with the establishment of the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union in 1886. Its establishment gave credence to this change, due to the 
fast-rising push for prohibition and a political alliance between the two movements, 
each of whom believed they could help each other achieve their goals.335 Seddon 
himself stated in 1886 that ‘if you give too much power you unsex women’336 and that 
women wouldn’t want the right to vote and would be burdened, away from their 
proper duties.337 Seddon voted against proposals for enfranchisement in 1879 and 
1887, and he abstained on the first Female Suffrage bill that passed the Lower House in 
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1891.338 By 1892, Ballance had attached female suffrage to an electoral bill, which 
passed through the Lower House, but it was amended by the Legislative Council to 
protect women from being ‘unsexed’, and only allowed the vote by post.339 Seddon, 
serving as leader for the sick Ballance, objected to the voting by post amendment as an 
affront to democracy and fair, private elections.340 
The bill was reintroduced by Seddon in 1893, where it once again reached the 
Legislative Council.341 Members of the Legislative Council, led by George McLean, who 
was against women’s suffrage, moved the amendment to vote by post that wrecked 
the previous Bill.342 The political calculus was changed at the last minute as two 
members of the Council changed their mind, and voted down the amendment, thereby 
giving women the vote, much to the surprise of Seddon.343 Seddon showed ill-
concealed dismay when the Bill finally passed, unsure of the leanings of the new 
female elector, and fearful that they would undo his plans for reform.344 He was 
proved wrong; women became part of his durable coalition of working New 
Zealanders, and by 1896 Seddon had changed tack completely after history 
demonstrated their value. Seddon voted in favour of a private member’s Bill for 
admitting women to Parliament, and pushed for more votes on the subject when this 
attempt failed.345 When speaking for the country abroad, Seddon used the vote for 
women as an example of another grand and successful New Zealand experiment, led 
by his far-sighted leadership.346 
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Land and Labour Policy 
The Liberals held together their coalition of common people through shared language 
and goals, and legislative reforms that sought to appease both the urban and rural 
working man. To do this, Seddon and his ministry had to convince the working poor 
that public money can, and should, be spent on helping the small farmer, while the 
individualistic small farmer had to be convinced that unions had a role in the managed 
economy.347 In 1894, two landmark legislative achievements detailed how Seddon’s 
personality-driven coalition would both survive and provide rewards to its supporters: 
John McKenzie’s agrarian land reforms and William Pember Reeves’ industrial relations 
policy.348  
Colonial experience had left much of the country’s productive land held by wealthy 
estates, an arrangement that immigrants such as Seddon and McKenzie had left the 
Old World to avoid. The Liberals put in place a programme of purchases of Maori land, 
a graduated land tax, and state acquisitions (at times forced) of estate land, and vastly 
expanded the power of the Agriculture Department to issue low-interest loans to the 
poor as well as provide technical assistance.349 In order to preserve the integrity of the 
workers’ arm of the party, which at times threatened to splinter into the slowly 
emerging labour leagues and federations, new industrial policy was championed.350 
Arbitration between a judge, employer, and union was set up in wage and work 
disputes, employment preference was given to union members of registered unions 
who had given up the right to strike, and the Factories Act brought child labour and 
excessive conditions and hours to an end.351 
These compromises left both sides mostly content. Potential for a split in the coalition 
remained, as neither urban nor rural was fully satisfied, and after the death of Seddon 
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and the rise of the conservative opposition into organised political parties, as well as 
the parallel formation of organised political labour movements, this did indeed 
occur.352 In office Seddon had achieved his aim, protecting his premiership and his 
party from a split, as he had done in the prohibition debate, as demonstrated in the 
following section. By inoculating against internal ructions in his voter base, he left his 
opponents, from both left and right, with little room to manoeuvre, and the playing 
field for his heresthetic gambits remained wide open. From his aggressive reforming 
foundation, Seddon could use popular issues to his advantage, and force his opposition 
into unwinnable scenarios, through the deployment of precise heresthetic defence. 
Prohibition 
The issues of prohibition and temperance reached high prominence in the late 19th 
century and early 20th century, and Seddon faced increased pressures on multiple 
fronts to address the problem of the ‘demon drink’. Much of this pressure came from 
his long time leadership rival, Sir Robert Stout. Although Stout had left Liberal politics 
to return to legal practice when Ballance died, he had nonetheless expected Seddon to 
move out of his way upon his return to Parliament. Seddon did not stand down, and he 
won a subsequent mandate for his leadership at the 1893 general election. Stout, a 
prohibitionist, saw potential disruption for Seddon through manipulation of the issue, 
particularly because Seddon himself was once a publican.353 Identified by Nagel as a 
heresthetical move designed to continue the rapid turnover of ministries of the pre-
party politics area and, with Opposition help, bring down Seddon’s premiership, Stout’s 
move was countered by Seddon in one his most decisive heresthetic displays.354 
Faced with an issue that had the potential both to split the Liberal Party at a stage 
when party politics was still a new phenomenon, and install a rival in his place as 
premier, Seddon reacted by manipulating the dimensionality of the system. Knowing 
that his rival had engaged in an effective heresthetical offensive manoeuvre, Seddon’s 
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heresthetical defence involved confounding the previously simplistic ‘wet’ or ‘dry’ 
argument, engineering a legislative and electoral process that, while not pleasing all 
suitors, would please enough to maintain the power of his premiership. 
Stout introduced a bill into Parliament calling for prohibition, designed to inflame and 
trigger a two-dimensional choice in the minds of the electorate and members; Seddon 
countered by introducing a bill he said would remove politics from the debate.355 His 
bill did this in three sections, by introducing conscience votes in Parliament on the 
issue; delegating responsibility for liquor licensing to local authority referendums; and 
not making a party stand on the issue, instead seeking a measure that would be in 
accord with public opinion.356 Seddon’s bill, in contrast to Stout’s, called for local 
referendums not to be conducted by a majority vote to either be ‘wet’ or ‘dry’, but 
rather through a  system of compromises, victory quotas and split options for either no 
increase, a reduction or total abolition of liquor licenses in each district.357 Turnout 
restrictions that would void the result of referendums were inserted, and full abolition 
required a higher vote of 60%, compared to the 50% for reduction or no change.358  
Parliament was convinced by this approach, and Seddon’s bill won passage, sending 
the issue to the local level, thus preventing Stout’s plan of rising to power in a general 
election on a wave of prohibition fervour. Both the liquor trade and prohibitionists 
helped Seddon’s Liberals send voters to the polls in the general election that ran 
parallel to the first of the referenda; with the passion of the local option votes driving 
up turnout, most voters from either side of the debate voted Liberal. Seddon’s 
complicated ballot measures ensured that while public support for some reduction in 
liquor licensing held, only one local district had gone dry by 1899. Seddon had masterly 
executed heresthetical defence, blunting the aggressive attack on a divisive issue by a 
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rival by adding new fields of choice, moving the arena of passion away from his sphere 
of power, and preserving the strength of his party and his leadership.359 
The Pork Barrel 
In reaction to the instability inherent in the years prior to his premiership, Seddon 
sought to restrict the avenues of influence to a smaller group, one identified by loyalty 
to party and to Seddon. Prior to party politics, individual members engaged in a level of 
pork-barrel politics that caused rapid turnover in ministries, as the old provincial 
governments scrambled for the loan-funded public works.360 Both to retain a strong 
grip on power and to enable his platform to be successful, Seddon remade the system 
of favours and promises in his favour, using parochial concerns and naked ambition to 
his advantage.361 
While in the past, members of coalitions were rewarded for rebellion by receiving 
public works projects in their districts in exchange for their continued loyalty, Seddon 
instead rewarded members who pledged to his leadership and the Liberal Party, and 
he ignored others.362 Seddon delayed funding and projections for public works 
spending until the latter stages of each session in order to put more pressure on 
recalcitrant members earlier in the session, and he summarised his position in 1905 by 
stating that: “it is unreasonable and unnatural to expect the Government to look with 
the same kindly eye on districts returning members opposed to the Government as on 
those which returned Government supporters”.363 Entrants into the rapidly growing 
civil service found themselves similarly rewarded for loyalty to Seddon, who bypassed 
competitive hiring laws by appointing many supporters to civil service cadetships. 
Nagel points to an example of Seddon rebutting his great rival, Sir Robert Stout, who 
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had accused Seddon of nepotism, by stating that in contrast to the strong loyalty to 
party under his watch, Stout had made a point of appointing political opponents, 
punishing good loyalty.364 
Prospective members were valued in a similar fashion to current members, and 
Seddon, at the height of his power, endorsed certain Liberal candidates when multiple 
ones were standing in one seat, an intervention without precedent, and only after 
receipt of what was known as the ‘hallmark’.365 The hallmark was a written pledge of 
support a candidate must sign in order to gain endorsement, swearing loyalty not just 
to the party but to Seddon himself. This blunt instrument was effective; Seddon was 
known to interject in the chamber to assert that a member’s district was actually won 
by him, in order to ensure no confusion over his influence was felt.366 In his Cabinet the 
same approach was employed, particularly after experimenting by appointing an ally of 
Stout to Cabinet in 1896, which heralded a period of minor instability.367 Seddon 
retreated into the tactic he knew: reward those who are loyal, and leave potential 
opponents out in the cold. In order to maintain policy and messaging stability, and 
increasingly paranoid about disloyalty and the potential of his large programme 
unravelling, Seddon was by 1905 simultaneously Premier, Treasurer, and Minister of 
Labour, Defence, Education, Immigration, Government Insurance and the Public 
Trust.368 This burden stifled debate, but it kept the Liberal government strong and 
steadfast, and succeeded in keeping power concentrated in the people’s champion, 
Seddon.  
The Pension 
By 1896, Seddon’s government had delivered many gains to New Zealand, had 
amassed large legislative achievements, and the Liberal coalition of town and country 
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seemed unbreakable. In response to issues that could split this grouping, Seddon 
continued to search for the battleground that could keep this alliance of the middle 
ground together. Nagel identified Seddon’s pension victory as a prime example of this 
heresthetical tactic of outflanking potential opponents from a position of strength - 
before they made, or thought to make, the move themselves. By both breaking new 
ground in liberal politics and reinforcing the commitment the Liberals held to the 
‘ordinary man’, Seddon timed his new plans for a government funded pension 
expertly.369 
Without a bill or fiscal plan, Seddon proposed the pension just before the 1896 
election, tantalising the voters and challenging the country to re-elect his government 
to see how this bold new policy could be funded. Duly re-elected, the bulk of the next 
term was dedicated to passing the bill, which was passed in 1898 amidst great 
opposition from conservative opponents - although the final shape of the bill was not 
as generous as Seddon knew it could have been, and it contained a provision for review 
just before the 1902 election.  
Comprehensively victorious at the 1899 election, Seddon hinted at increases in the 
pension rate and a lowering of the eligibility age in the review process; and 
subsequently he again talked of the possibility of a subsidised, worker contributory 
plan that was not means tested, this time during the 1905 campaign.370 The 
rural/urban coalition held; those of modest means duly re-elected a government eager 
to aid these ‘battlers’, and offer increasingly more generous forms of public assistance, 
in retirement, education and work. Seddon did not merely respond to public opinion; 
he formed it, with programmes previously unheard of in much of the world, and he 
then raised the spectre of losing these newfound gains if his government were not re-
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elected. This is a cogent example of heresthetics ahead of either opposition 
manoeuvring or public demand.371 
Nagel supplies an apt quote of Seddon speaking to future Liberal Prime Minister Joseph 
Ward, one that demonstrates the tactical thinking behind his legislative expansionism: 
“You are too young, Ward. You want to give everything at once. You should always 
keep something up your sleeve for next year. Keep the bastards on a string then they’ll 
keep you in office”.372 
Creation of the ‘People’ and the ‘Other’ 
While Richard Seddon fits the definitions provided by Shepsle and Riker of a 
heresthetic leader, the application of the theoretical frameworks of Panizza and Laclau 
also help inform us about his brand of populism. Seddon stands apart in this study as 
the leader who most broadly draws from both the heresthetic and populist schools of 
political leadership; Seddon can thus be viewed as a populist operating as a 
heresthetician, strategic but also grounded in a connection to the ordinary man’s 
hopes and prejudices.  
Seddon is the bridge between the three case studies: a master heresthetician, whom 
subsequent leaders have attempted to replicate through their pursuit of public 
opinion, but one who shares with Peters and Lee the emotional connection to the 
masses, the vast ‘people’ of whom they believe they are the champion. The following 
analysis will illustrate a rare political colossus, a leader who manipulates his strategic 
environment for political victory, but does so from a base of genuine empathy and 
shared experience with the common man. 
A crucial tenet of Francisco Panizza’s definition of traditional populism is that the 
‘people’, established by a process of both in- and out-group naming, is the core 
political actor in a populism movement. In Seddon’s case, this would refer to the 
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movement he built around himself, and the wider Liberal movement that was 
ultimately shaped and defined by him. 
From his early political experiences on the West Coast amongst rough-hewn miners, 
traders and local agitators, Seddon’s people-driven populism began to take hold of his 
political personality. In his seminal biography of Seddon, R.M. Burdon writes that this 
experience of community meant that Seddon assimilated their thoughts and feelings, 
and that “as a meter for registering public reactions he never failed to function with 
astonishing accuracy. His ability to interpret the general will enabled him on more 
occasions than one to appear as a creator of the public opinion that in actual fact he 
only followed”.373 
Seddon knew his popularity was the source of his power, and he dedicated much of his 
public life to its upkeep. Seddon had an impeccable memory, particularly for names, 
faces, and personal details, and could return to the subject of a conversation ended 
months or years ago on the next meeting.374 He had little in common with intellectuals, 
many of whom were repelled by his crudeness, and were unwilling to see his qualities 
and skills as a master of political power.375  The naming process undertaken by the 
Liberal alliance and Seddon was to define the ‘people’ as those of modest means in the 
towns and the country. It is worth noting that this could be done in a genuine way, as 
the Premier himself had fit this definition.  
Liberal populism defined the ‘people’ in the mould of Seddon himself: hard working, 
congenial, but with a distaste for those who had been born into wealth, privilege, and 
social position, and against new threats to a homogenous, egalitarian nation, such as 
agitating Maori and immigrant Chinese. This process is what Panizza terms an ‘anti-
status quo discourse’, a process of naming who the ‘people’ will be within a populist 
movement, and who the ‘other’ will be, in this case the status quo that had ruled New 
Zealand before the rise of Seddon’s working class: the landed estates, and the British 
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born political class. Nagel notes that, in the view of Hamer, the Liberals believed in the 
wholeness of the concept of ‘the people’, and as such, were uncomfortable with 
narrow class-based legislation.376 
The slow awakening of ‘the people’ as a political idea had begun by the 1890 General 
Election, with the working man, in the aftermath of a broken maritime strike, 
beginning to coalesce around like-minded Liberals, as action through politics became 
more important than action by strike. Seddon, and his contemporaries in the Ballance 
Cabinet, such as John McKenzie, a Scot who vowed to break up the large estates, 
became a focal point for working class concern; they stood as ordinary men with 
extraordinary ability to cajole and persuade. The effect of this early stirring of industrial 
power elected five Liberal Government-supporting labour-backed members, enabling a 
Liberal speaker to be elected.377  
In the context of the 1896 election campaign, Burdon writes a passage that 
encapsulates the place for the ‘people’ in Seddon’s brand of power populism: “the 
actual substance of Seddon’s remarks was less effectual in gaining votes than his own 
stimulating, ubiquitous presence. Because its expression was both genuine and 
spontaneous his goodwill was irresistible. No Premier had ever made his face, voice 
and figure familiar to so wide a range of the populace. No Premier had ever shown 
such positive and obvious delight in their society. Popular demands he anticipated; 
popular aspirations he treated with understanding and sympathy; popular prejudice he 
shared. The humblest among his packed audience thrilled with pleasure and pride to 
see that a great man, despite his greatness, could appear so very like one of them”.378 
Laclau also points to the process of active naming being a central tenet of populism, 
particularly through a process of identifying an enemy of which an alternative ‘people’ 
can be constructed. Seddon’s personal philosophy of supporting the ordinary man was 
identified by Burdon as not being guided by political principles but by a “self-imposed 
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obligation to protect the under-dog against the agents of economic tyranny. As 
executor of the people’s will he took infinite pains to discover and carry out their 
wishes. Seddon had always regarded big business with dislike and suspicion”.379 We 
see that Seddon was both steeped in the traditions and ambitions of the common man, 
and that he  developed his type of populism through a reflection of his fellow New 
Zealanders’ prejudices, in a process that solidifies who Seddon’s populism viewed as 
the true ‘people’, and who was viewed as the enemy of the people.  
Immigration 
As noted in Randall Burdon’s King Dick, from his early days as a parliamentary 
candidate, stemming from his alarm at the large numbers of Chinese who came to the 
goldfields, Seddon had almost always attacked Chinese migrants in his speeches.380 
One of his notable practices as an early opposition politician was to draw attention to 
sensationalist cases of any malpractice by Chinese workers, and despite the 1881 poll 
tax that put in place a 10 pound fee on any Chinese immigrant, Seddon pushed for 
further restrictions.381 Seddon successfully lobbied to have increases in penalties for 
ship owners bringing over Chinese workers without paying the tax, as well as limits to 
the number of Chinese that could be transported as a ratio to the size of the ship.382 
Seddon publically sparred with his long time rival Sir Robert Stout over the issue, 
accusing Stout of owning shares in a mine where Chinese labour was used.383  His time 
as Premier also saw a deliberate and significant reduction of the Chinese population in 
New Zealand, from 5004 in 1881 to 2846 in 1901, mainly due to the dramatic rise in the 
poll tax from 10 pounds to 100 pounds in 1896.384 
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Imperialism 
Nagel identifies New Zealand and British patriotism as an ongoing popular device used 
by Seddon. Seddon used the state reforms of his administration to inspire, calling them 
world leading, pioneering and unique to New Zealand. He summoned imperial fervour 
through his passionate support of the Boer War, winning many votes and swaying all 
but a few members of Parliament. He also caused embarrassment with his patriotic 
rhetoric when visiting South Africa after the War in 1902, interrupting delicate peace 
talks by demanding the Boers unconditionally surrender to Imperial forces.385  
Nagel notes that this considerably helped Seddon win the 1899 and 1902 elections. In 
1901 the grandson of Queen Victoria arrived for New Zealand’s first grand royal visit, 
and Seddon was omnipresent at all events in full regalia, organising showings of old 
age pensioners and war heroes supported by the state, all products of the pioneering 
reforms.386 Against British wishes, Seddon forcefully lobbied for imperial annexation of 
Samoa, to be administered by New Zealand, and the incorporation of Fiji into New 
Zealand.387 Seddon attacked British caution at a time when the United States had taken 
Hawaii in 1898, a move Seddon let be known publically was not preferable to a British 
administration. His nationalism eventually wore down the Imperial Colonial Office to 
allow New Zealand to annex the Cook Islands in 1901.388 
Idolism 
Ernesto Laclau’s definition of what constitutes populism identifies a key aspect of a 
populist leader – namely, their embodiment of the movement itself. Laclau refers to 
the clarity this gives to such a movement and states that it is what can set populist 
parties and movements apart from brief excursions into popularity-driven populism. 
When the leader defines and embodies what it means to be part of the ‘people’, it 
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defines the movement itself and establishes what (and who) its enemies are. Seddon’s 
fervent following amongst his fellow Coasters was the original support base for this 
movement, and a regional populism in Laclau’s definition emerged. It is only after a 
period of consolidation in the Premiership that he began to be seen as his own man, 
defined apart from his predecessor, Ballance.  
Burdon writes that a symbol emerged by the time Seddon’s power was far reaching 
and impenetrable; “the title of ‘King Dick’ was approved both by friends and enemies 
though for entirely different reasons, the latter accepting it as a satirical comment on 
his despotic methods, while for the former it served as an expression of unstinted 
admiration. His tenure of office represented the nearest approach to permanent 
power that had been witnessed in the Australasian colonies. What conceivable 
combination of forces might be expected to oust him from a position that he appeared 
to have rendered impregnable? Premiers came and went at the people’s will; kings 
were less easily displaced”.389 
Shared Values and Closeness to the Populace 
Summarising Seddon’s contribution to history after his death, Burdon identified his 
rugged egalitarianism, his distaste for organized wealth and privilege, and his genuine 
closeness to his constituents as political legacies; “Seddon’s egalitarian precepts, 
though never practiced in the actual administration of government, were preached 
with enormous effect. In his day New Zealand politics lost what semblance they had 
ever had of being the preserve of a privileged class; nor since his death has wealth or 
social position been anything but a handicap in the political field”.390 Burdon further 
stated that “Seddon’s statesmanship was guided and governed by a love of humanity. 
The tradition of the commonplace in public life, to which he subscribed and gave 
countenance, was also a tradition of self-sacrifice, accessibility, and sympathy towards 
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the helpless – a tradition that none of his successors have wished or dared to 
ignore”.391 
As discussed previously, Seddon shared the prejudices of his fellow countrymen, and 
this aided the formation of the ‘people’ present in his populism, through a process of 
in- and out- group formation identified by Panizza as present in all populist 
movements. As early as the 1879 election, Seddon had attacked Maori agitation 
against European expansion in the tenured lands, stating that he thought that roads 
and railways driven through the Maori hinterland would be more effective than armed 
coercion. As identified in the earlier section on immigration policy and positioning, 
Seddon believed that immigration was dangerous, and that “you could not reason with 
Chinamen; in fact immigration of any sort should be restricted”.392 While tactically 
useful, these prejudices were genuine in Seddon’s case, not merely a heresthetic 
manoeuvre in order to deny his opponents issue space. 
Known as a man of the people in all senses of the phrase, Seddon, in the words of 
Burdon, came to know the character of a nation as other men come to know the 
character of personal friends.393 The access he accorded to his electorate was 
immense; people would queue outside his house to ask him for favours and suggest to 
him policy, and by the peak of his power he began riding on horseback in the streets of 
Wellington, both for his health and to reduce the amount of people who could stop 
him in the streets to praise or cajole him.394 The lengths Seddon would go to retain his 
personal link to his voters are legendary; long treks throughout the provinces, late 
night debating sessions and a notable recurring scenario detailed in Seddon’s 
biography. Visitors would frequently call on Seddon at Parliament, and Seddon would 
take them in, particularly if they were fellow West Coasters. Seddon, after realizing 
that a meeting had gone overtime, would ring a secret bell to his secretary, who would 
come in to remind him of an urgent Cabinet meeting. Seddon would, in faux outrage, 
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state that he was busy with friends, and would repeat this spectacle two or three 
times. The guest would leave, and tell their family and friends that the man of the 
people, King Dick, had kept Cabinet waiting on their personal conversation.395  
Intertwining with his predilection for patronage, Seddon would help his fellow Coasters 
to an end that would greatly anger his opponents; when told that a Coaster, who had 
been in a Government department by Seddon, was told that he could not work there 
due to the fact that he could not read or write, Seddon simply told the departmental 
head that he should teach him how to.396 Another occasion was detailed where Seddon 
had gone fishing on a Sunday; and after coming under attack from church groups for 
disrespecting the Sabbath, Seddon received defence from a vast segment of the 
people, incensed that worriers would deny their hero some rare leisure.397  
Legacy 
Burdon reflects on the level to which Seddon had come to define both the Liberals and 
New Zealand itself, solidifying a form of state populism and idolism that has yet to be 
matched. Burdon states that Seddon had not only been head of the country’s 
government; he was the government itself, and when King Dick died the monarchy 
itself came to an end. His legacy was inescapable, even for his opponents. Burdon 
writes that Prime Minister William Massey “sought to exploit and perpetuate his 
memory by choosing the name of ‘Reform’ for the party he led to power. Those who 
held reactionary views chose other party designations and even claimed to be 
following in the footsteps of the great Liberal”.398 
The Gustafson Framework and Richard Seddon 
The application of Barry Gustafson’s six-point framework of New Zealand populist 
political leadership to Richard Seddon’s career will enable the study to test the results 
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of the preceding political biography and theory application. As stated in the 
introductory remarks to this chapter, Seddon is both heresthetician and populist, and 
the analysis of specific evidence has demonstrated that there is a balance between 
examples of traditional populism and heresthetic manoeuvres in his career. The 
historical bridge between the two competing theory camps, Seddon is therefore 
expected to be found to meet at least half of Gustafson’s six criteria. The traditional 
populism of Seddon will lend itself to match with some of Gustafson’s criteria, while 
the heresthetic approach will lead Seddon, as a case study, away from Gustafson’s 
definition of a populist leader. In the following section, each of Gustafson’s six criteria 
will be applied to Seddon, in the context of the preceding analysis of his political 
biography, and the empirical evidence that was identified when applying populist 
theory and heresthetics. Following this, an estimate of the amount of Gustafson’s 
criteria met by the Seddon case study will be stated. A brief summary of concluding 
remarks in relation to Seddon will end the chapter. 
The Six Criteria 
1. The leader claims to know what ‘ordinary’ people desire and believe, in contrast to 
corrupted and ignorant political parties and leaders of the established elite.  
Seddon’s ‘ordinary’ credentials are unquestioned, due to his language, presentation 
and history, and his knowledge of the desires and stresses of the common man were 
clear. Seddon positioned himself against outside ‘others’, such as immigrants, those 
who stood against the will of the British Empire, big business and agitating labour. His 
repertoire of enemies of the great ‘people’, the Liberal electoral alliance, did not 
include much of the political elite; indeed, he could be read as part of the elite as a 
supporter of the Grey Ministry, and as Ballance’s successor. The true skill of Seddon is 
demonstrated in how he fashioned the elite-level alliance of the Liberal Party to 
realise, through his heresthetic abilities and political strength, policy goals that gave 
ordinary people what they desired, sometimes before they even knew they desired it. 
- Criterion Partially Met - 
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2. The leader draws their support from the marginalised and out-of-power, particularly 
during recession and rapid change.  
Seddon’s Liberal coalition, forged from those of modest means in the cities and 
country, was unique among past-colonial administrations, as they were often based on 
large land holding interests alongside organised business. Many ‘ordinary folk’ saw 
themselves in Seddon. Seddon came to power when these two classes were in a period 
of struggle, during the long depression of the late 1800s. However, once in power, the 
reforms instigated by Seddon lifted many of these groups into an emerging middle 
class, with new social protections a reminder of his influence. Those once marginalised 
had influence over the decisions of the state, through Seddon’s comprehensive system 
of favours and patronage, and many who supported Seddon found themselves now in 
positions of power themselves. Those on the left of politics also agitated, more notably 
closer to Seddon’s death, for a more worker-focussed movement aligned away from 
middle class and artisan demands, although this break did not occur until significantly 
later. While Seddon drew his support from those who did not have a voice to power, 
his reshaping of New Zealand changed this dynamic, so the marginalised now became 
the class the state was most responsive to. 
- Criterion Partially Met - 
3. The leader is anti-elitist, and sees hidden agendas behind decisions that affect 
business and government, that are detrimental to the ‘silent majority’.  
Seddon’s demeanour and rhetoric was clearly anti-elitist, framed by his genuine 
experience of struggle and living and working the hard life on the West Coast. Seddon 
saw himself as a figure, with manipulation, that led the ‘silent majority’ of working men 
on the farm and in the workshop. However, as a supporter of the Grey government, 
and through the deals and bargains made on his way to the premiership, such hidden 
agendas being undertaken in New Zealand could often be linked to Seddon himself. 
Once in government, Seddon ruthlessly focussed on trumpeting his own achievements, 
which were large and impressive in scale, and moved his political strategy to one that 
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still related to his support base, but rather acted as a representative for them inside 
the elite, rather than railing against it. Compared to his academic contemporaries in 
high office, many of whom were filtered out as he consolidated Cabinet around 
himself, Seddon never truly became one of the elite in the perception of his people. 
- Criterion Met - 
4. The leader is nationalistic, inward looking and opposed to foreign ‘meddling’ or 
investment. This can sometimes be ethnocentric and racist. Immigration is a common 
issue in which a ‘them-us’ divide is forged.  
Seddon was a fierce patriot and Imperialist, proud of both New Zealand and the 
mother country. His excursions into imperialism, which angered Great Britain, 
demonstrated the projection of power he desired to bring to New Zealand foreign 
policy. Seddon was vocally opposed to Chinese immigration, viewing Chinese as both 
untrustworthy and indecent. One of his Government’s most popular achievements and 
one in which Seddon took great pride was the increased poll tax, designed to 
discourage Chinese immigration. Seddon’s tactical and heartfelt reverence for the 
Royal visits, in which he proudly demonstrated the products of his state, as well as the 
outsize force he sent to fight the Boer rebellion in South Africa, all illustrate the Empire  
nationalism Seddon embodied. 
- Criterion Met - 
5. The leader uses a simplified nostalgia to hark back to a ‘Golden Age’ of prosperity 
and security.  
Seddon’s leadership and heresthetic populism was focussed primarily on each 
upcoming legislative challenge, with Seddon employing heresthetic devices and 
rhetoric to appeal to future achievements. Seddon’s accomplishments were large and 
ground-breaking, and therefore much of the positive language employed by Seddon 
pointed towards recent Liberal achievements, for which Seddon was either responsible 
or to which he was closely linked. While aspects of New Zealand’s settler past were 
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viewed fondly by Seddon, his pride and boastfulness was aimed at the grand 
achievements of his premiership, as he genuinely believed the newly forged New 
Zealand state was an example for the world. In warnings to the electorate of the 
danger of not returning his party to office, Seddon would invoke such nostalgia. 
- Criterion Not Met - 
6. The leader is the operational leader of the movement, section or party but comes to 
embody it publically.  
While an elected Premier, Seddon’s larger than life demeanour and his systematic 
dominance of the political landscape meant that the New Zealand state itself, along 
with the Liberal Party, came to be embodied by Seddon. His influence over the public 
service, through projects and appointments, and his adept mastery at setting the issue 
agenda through grand proposals, rendered both those in his own party who were 
sycophants, and his political opposition, to be perpetually irrelevant. The Liberal Party, 
controlled in its appointments, Parliamentary candidates and direction by Seddon, was 
seen by much of the citizenry as Seddon’s party.  
- Criterion Met - 
Amount of Criteria Met 
4/6 – Three Met, Two Partially Met 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that Richard Seddon, while meeting most of 
Gustafson’s criteria for a populist New Zealand leader, can be more accurately 
categorized by a combination of theoretical perspectives. Seddon, as shown by the five 
heresthetic examples, was a calculating leader, concerned with the strategy-value of 
sentences and the strategic positioning of his party to form political coalitions. He 
would expand dimensionality in order to construct winning positions for his arguments, 
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and once secure in power would undertake notable cases of heresthetic defence to 
deny his opponents opportunities to destabilize his leadership.  
Seddon also had a deep grounding in populist rhetoric and positioning. He was adept at 
forming a ‘people’, the ordinary working man of country and city, and defining that 
grouping against a named ‘other’: immigrants, ethnic groups, landed elites, the political 
class, wealthy businessmen, the enemies of Britain and his political opponents. In cue 
with Panizza and Laclau’s populism, a strong idolism formed around Seddon as he 
came to dominate his movement, and the rise of his leadership defined his young 
party. These points are demonstrated both through Gustafson’s framework, and 
through the four populist examples displayed in this chapter. 
What this case study has discovered is that there is a fourth type of populism outside 
of Gustafson’s framework, Panizza and Laclau’s paradigm, and Riker’s heresthetic. This 
form of populism can be termed heresthetic populism, in which the leader’s positions 
and personality cannot be separated from their populist heritage and their grounding 
amongst their citizens. This placement helps to explain why, in the context of most 
failed populist leaders, Seddon was very successful. Seddon’s ability to view his political 
arena as one of disequilibrium, and his willingness to manipulate issue choices and 
dimensionality, coupled with the shared values, prejudices and divisions he held with 
the electoral coalition he forged, enabled him to espouse populism, separating society 
into in- and out- groups, whilst still being able to construct winning political outcomes. 
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Chapter Six - Renshon and Character  
The preceding analysis placed each case study within an appropriate theoretical 
construct, and determined the validity of previous academic claims regarding New 
Zealand populism. While this answers the question of what type of populism each 
leader possessed or possesses, it does not explain what, in regards to the leader’s 
personality and character, underpinned the leader’s particular brand of populism. The 
subsequent analysis will attempt to provide a qualitative explanation of the particular 
brand of populism of each case study. 
It is proposed that of the three foundations of character, as identified by Stanley 
Renshon, canvassed in the earlier discussion of theory in the literature review, the 
domain of relatedness has the greatest explanatory power when differentiating each of 
the populists in this study.  This section draws upon the picture of each leader 
presented in the historical analysis of the case study chapters. 
Renshon describes relatedness as ‘one’s basic stance towards relationships with 
others’, and categorises it into three separate types of relationship stance. As stated 
earlier in this study, Renshon states that leaders either move towards others in 
relationships, move away from others, or move against others. Leaders who move 
towards others reach out to people to begin and maintain relationships; leaders who 
move away leave relationships after they outlast their use, or are disappointed by 
previous relationships; and leaders who move against people seek to make contact, 
but not in a friendly or intimate fashion. In relation to determining factors of political 
outcomes, Renshon states that relatedness is linked to a leader’s ambition and 
character integrity, reinforcing the entirety of the foundations of character.  
John A. Lee 
Patterns of Relatedness  
John A. Lee, as identified in his political biography, grew up in a harsh world of poverty, 
vice, and crime. Raised by a single mother, his family suffered through her alcoholism, 
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grinding poverty and forced prostitution. Lee as a teenager spent his formative years 
on the run, in a repressive military school, working harsh summers of manual labour, 
and eventually in prison. The changing environments of his early life and the harshness 
of conditions meant that Lee did not foster close relationships until his time amongst 
his peers on the battlefield in World War I. Lee saw himself as a soldier above all else, 
and it is possible that the closest Lee ever felt towards a group of people was during his 
time serving in the army. His discovery of socialism as a young man also opened his 
eyes to relationships based on the collective good, in stark contrast to the world he 
saw around him. As politics became his sole purpose following his return to New 
Zealand, Lee drew large crowds and followers, and he had a dedicated partner in his 
wife throughout his life. While Lee was now surrounded by people offering good will 
and support, his biographies have little mention of close friends, in politics or 
otherwise. Lee was not a total social recluse, but spent much of his time outside of 
politics writing his novels and books, and reading. He was ultimately content when 
writing, calling it his first love, and retired to his book store in his old age.  
His relationship stances in caucus politics tell us much about his relatedness. Lee had 
loose allies in the political left of the caucus, but would often clash with the party 
establishment, and would vocalise his objections in caucus to a level that would ensure 
disdain and punishment from Savage, Fraser and Nash. Lee could not bring himself to 
cultivate politically useful relationships with those whom he disagreed with in Labour, 
viewing them as beyond reproach. This was demonstrated by the fact that a man of his 
talent was not originally picked for Cabinet, the manner in which the party turned on 
him regarding his expulsion, and the fact that only Bill Barnard, one of his few friends 
on the left of the caucus who stayed with Lee, left to join the Democratic Labour Party 
following its formation. 
Shaped by formative experiences, and reinforced by the disappointment felt about his 
Labour colleagues who did not embrace the socialist vision he had for New Zealand and 
instead supported what he viewed as a corrupted regime, Lee’s political life is 
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characterised by a relationship stance that moved against people. Lee’s relatedness 
reinforced his politics; his unwillingness to cultivate politically useful relationships 
sustained his anti-establishment leanings and his populism was forged in a harsh world 
that he believed had betrayed him, and was confrontational and inflexible.  
Winston Peters 
Patterns of Relatedness  
Winston Peters’ political career has been defined by a stance in relationships that 
moves away from others. Peters stated early in his career that his political philosophy 
could be summarised as ‘independence’, and since his entry to parliament through a 
legally contested recount battle in Hunua, Peters has been confrontational in his 
relationships. The sustained abuse directed towards Peters in his early political career 
by Labour members who believed he had stolen the election framed much of his 
conduct in opposition. Peters dedicated his time in the House to scandal, intrigue and 
conspiracy, with varying degrees of success. Peters maintained friendships with the 
National MPs he shared his Wellington flat with, although he acted independently of 
them much of the time, ignoring their advice on the degree to which he sustained his 
attacks. Following his election into cabinet in 1990, in which he received a low ranking 
and found out his placement from a journalist, it was clear that Peters had not 
successfully sought out or maintained political relationships with the party 
establishment that would have aided his rise. His earlier failure to agree on an 
arrangement with the Richardson faction in which he would take over as leader from 
Bolger also demonstrates this unwillingness to compromise or forge relationships for 
political gain. 
His sacking from cabinet, and de-selection as a National candidate, showed that this 
independence could not function in a party in which his success would be determined 
by an ability to maintain useful relationships. At this time his friendships with the MPs 
he had shared a home with also deteriorated. New Zealand First, a vehicle dominated 
by Peters, suited his relatedness, in which his dominance of the party allowed him to 
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naturally stand off from his colleagues. Peters’ time in government with National was 
hampered by his relatedness; he was outmanoeuvred by Finance Minister Bill Birch in 
economic policy, and could not effectively manage his own caucus. The breakdown in 
the relationship with the Prime Minister after the ascension of Jenny Shipley, and the 
inability of Peters to cultivate a meaningful relationship with her, comparable to the 
one that he had managed with Jim Bolger, doomed the National-New Zealand First 
coalition to failure. 
Peters is a clear example of a politician whose basic relatedness stance is to move away 
from others. He has often neglected to begin or maintain important relationships, or 
move away from them when they are either not politically useful, or if he feels 
betrayed. While Peters has formed useful political relationships in the past, ones based 
on respect and clear boundaries, such as those with Bolger and Clark, his general 
tendency is to move away from his fellow politicians and supporters, and this has been 
demonstrated through the manner in which his political fortunes have fallen in his 
career, and the legal challenges he has been forced to mount to defend his conduct 
and integrity.  
Richard Seddon 
Patterns of Relatedness 
Richard Seddon’s life was built on the foundation of the people; both as a wider 
concept and as a literal process of interaction throughout his career. From his early life 
as a gold prospector, a publican and a community council member, Seddon was a 
public figure. He had an uncanny ability to remember names and faces, and would 
entertain his customers in his shops and public hotels with stories and feats of 
strength. Seddon was an aggressive networker, cultivating a long list of political and 
social contacts, all of whom aided his rise to Parliament, and whom Seddon would go 
to extraordinary lengths to please. Seddon’s ascension to power was aided by the 
relationships he maintained from the time of the Grey ministry, of which he was a 
supporter, and this helped him defeat his rival, Stout, for the Liberal premiership. As 
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Premier, stories of the closeness between Seddon and his constituents are detailed 
extensively in the preceding case study chapter.  
His great strategic legislative victories can in part be attributed to his excellent powers 
of persuasion, and his ability to read people’s emotions and aims. Seddon would use 
personal relationships to build an entire government in his name, through extensive 
networks of patronage, friendships, nepotism and favours. Seddon would work with his 
fellow MPs on matters of large legislative importance until late at night, and his House 
schedules when facing filibusters and wrecking amendments were punishing. Seddon 
began to alienate himself from his Cabinet in his final years, as he concentrated power 
and portfolios around him, but the personal connections did not dissipate; he merely 
no longer trusted the affairs of a state, as defined by him, to be run by any other 
actors. 
Seddon’s political life was defined by a relationship stance that moved towards people. 
Hence, Renshon’s leader who moves towards people, reaching out to begin and 
maintain relationships to further their political goals, defines Seddon accurately. 
Seddon was comfortable around his fellow working-class “common man”, and actively 
sought social connection constantly. Seddon’s working life was built around 
maintaining relationships for profit and friendship, his political rise was characterised 
by the use of networks and relationships to gain power, and his maintenance and 
domination of political power was built upon a foundation of relationships, friends, 
favours and patronage.  
Conclusion  
Through the application of Renshon’s foundations of character, a qualitative 
explanation of the differing types of populism evident in each case study can be 
identified. A clear trend is noticeable. Lee and Peters, the two case studies that fit 
Gustafson’s model of New Zealand populism, and most closely match the populist 
theorems of Panizza and Laclau, both move against or away from others in their basic 
stance of relatedness. In contrast, Seddon, the case study that least resembles 
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Gustafson’s New Zealand populist leader and demonstrates multiple examples of 
heresthetics, moves towards people in his basic stance of relationships with others. 
When viewing these case studies from the position of political success, the value of 
Renshon’s analysis increases. The true populists in the study, Lee and Peters, have 
been less politically successful than Seddon, who rose to the Prime Ministership, 
maintained the support of his political party, and did not have to resign in political 
disgrace. Renshon’s model help explain this phenomenon; the ability of each leader to 
seek out and maintain useful political relationships is evident in the character of the 
more successful leaders, while those who have rebelled against and been disciplined by 
their parties have lacked this crucial ability.  
This construct can also explain why Seddon, despite holding populist positions, and 
being grounded in the values and language of populism, could become a successful 
heresthetician; his interpersonal skills could overcome unstable populist fervour. 
Through the use of Renshon’s analysis, we can also see why strategic attempts by Lee 
and Peters, as canvassed in the case study chapters, failed; a true master of the art of 
heresthetics must possess a clear view of his strategic playing field, but also must have 
the ability to place their opponents in unwinnable situations, and to gain this ability 
you must be able to be flexible and maintain relationships in order to gain, maintain 
and solidify political power.  
This analysis has shown that there are similarities in the foundations of character 
among the pure populists, and there are significant differences in some of the 
foundations of character between these pure populists and the populist heresthetician. 
It is expected that these patterns would continue with further analysis of a wider 
selection of case studies. This brief exploration of one crucial explanatory variable 
portends a rich future research area as psychologically informed analysis can add 
further layers of depth to the understanding of the forces that forge and foster 
populism. 
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Chapter Seven - Conclusion 
This study has demonstrated that, through the application of theoretical frameworks, 
we can acquire important information about both the classification of populist leaders 
and their character. Three quantitative theories, traditional populism, Gustafson’s 
model, and heresthetics, were identified, reviewed and applied to three specially 
selected case studies of leaders who have been labelled ‘populist’. One crucial 
dimension of a fourth theory, Renshon’s foundation of character; namely, 
‘relatedness’, was identified and applied to the case studies, to provide a qualitative 
explanation of each leader’s particular style of populism. This section will discuss the 
results of this process: in particular, what the process tells us about the leaders, the 
theoretical frameworks, and populism in New Zealand. It will provide two new 
frameworks to the academic literature: a multi-methodological model for the analysis 
of populist leadership in New Zealand, and a populist continuum on which to place 
individual populists once said analysis is completed.  The thesis will conclude with a 
discussion of where future study should be directed. 
The first of the case study leaders, John A. Lee, is placed clearly into the pure populist 
classification. Application of the competing theory strands introduced into the analysis, 
traditional populism and heresthetics, demonstrated evidence of a high occurrence of 
traditionally populist decisions in Lee’s political career, and only two heresthetic 
manoeuvres, of which one was a failed attempt. Analysis of John A. Lee through the 
prism of Gustafson’s six-point framework found a strong correlation, in which five of 
the criteria for populist leadership were met. As was hypothesised, Gustafson’s model 
was broadly accurate in identifying and classifying Lee’s brand of populism. The strong 
result for both traditional populism and Gustafson’s framework identifies Lee as a pure 
populist in the multi-methodological model, and Renshon’s foundations of character 
act as a useful qualitative explanation of this identification. The application of 
Renshon’s theorems demonstrated that Lee’s relatedness was found to be generally 
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placed in the ‘against’ sphere, as Lee’s career showed a notable failure to successfully 
function in groups, or foster useful long-term political friendships. 
The second case study leader, Winston Peters, is also ultimately placed into the pure 
populist classification. When applying heresthetics and Panizza and Laclau’s populism 
to Peters’ political career, many clear examples of traditional populism were identified, 
while only two examples of heresthetics were found, of which one was a failed 
attempt, as in the case of Lee. The application of Gustafson’s framework to Peters 
produced a very strong correlation, in which all six criteria were met. Peters appears to 
be the specific leader, or at least one of the leaders, Gustafson had envisioned when 
crafting the framework. The pure populism of Peters, and the classification of this in 
the multi-methodological model, is clear in the context of these results. Through 
applying Renshon’s relatedness construct, we can see that, similar to Lee, Peters’ 
relatedness stance is seen to be broadly away from people. Peters functions 
moderately successfully within groups, but does not become particularly close to 
fellow politicians, or foster useful long-term political friendships. He is not naturally 
antagonistic in his stance, but his rigid character undermines his ability to operate 
within co-operative group structures. 
The final case study leader, Richard Seddon, provides us with the first major diversion 
in both classification and explanation. Seddon is what is termed a ‘mixed variant’ in the 
multi-methodological model of populist leadership: a populist heresthetician. Through 
the application of Panizza, Laclau and Riker’s theorems, a balance of empirical evidence 
is found for both traditional populism and heresthetics in Seddon’s career. When 
applying Gustafson’s six-point framework to Seddon, a moderate correlation is found, 
in which four of the six criteria are met. Therefore, a mixed classification is appropriate 
for Seddon. After applying Renshon’s foundations of character to Seddon’s leadership, 
the standout result reinforces a key divergence from the previous two case studies. His 
relatedness is broadly defined as a relationship stance that moves towards others, 
seeking out human contact and friendship, functioning successfully in groups, although 
126 
 
often through his personal dominance, and cultivating political alliances when 
necessary. This is in contrast to Lee’s relationship stance against others, and Peters’ 
movements away from others in relationships. 
Through active application of the Gustafson model, the study has illustrated the 
strengths of the model, and the clear weakness. As demonstrated by the multi-
methodological model, Gustafson’s framework is very effective at identifying pure 
populist leaders, such as Peters and Lee. When confronted with more nuanced variants 
of populism, the Gustafson model still has cogency, as demonstrated by the fact that 
Seddon still met a majority of the criteria, but does not accurately explain the finer 
details of such variants. The decision to include a strategic analysis of leadership in the 
study, through heresthetics, has proved to be valuable in the formulation of the final 
model, due to this weakness in the current pre-eminent model of New Zealand 
populism. Gustafson’s model is clearly academically sound, and as such is co-opted into 
the model, but this study has shown that through broad theoretical tools, we can 
produce more accurate classifications of populist leaders. 
The two main competing theory strands of the study, traditional populism and 
heresthetics, were found to be usefully applicable to the careers of leaders, and 
enabled the study to attain insights into differing styles of populism. Clear empirical 
evidence that matched up to one of the two theories was able to be identified. As 
hypothesised, Panizza and Laclau’s theorems were found to reach similar conclusions 
about case studies as Gustafson’s model, and it became clear that these two theories 
accurately explained large aspects of pure populism. Heresthetics was found to be a 
compelling alternative explanation for leadership that seeks to build popular coalitions, 
and through the analysis of Seddon, the study illustrated the capability of a leader to 
mould the two competing strands into a powerful form of political dominance over a 
system. 
Renshon’s foundations of character are found to be an effective qualitative explanation 
of the classification result of the multi-methodological model, with particular 
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similarities and contrasts demonstrated by the cleavages between the pure populists 
and the mixed variant of the study. This explanation points to key deciding factors in a 
leader’s character that can allow them to be drawn, unconsciously or consciously, to 
certain styles of populism. Exploration of case studies in the multi-methodological 
model in future scholarship will enable the assumptions around the validity of using 
Renshon’s foundations of character as a qualitative explanation to be more rigorously 
tested. 
What follows are diagrams which provide visual representations of the multi-
methodological model advanced in this conclusion. 
Figure 7.1. Multi-Methodological Model of Populist Leadership 
 
A New Theoretical Tool – The Multi Methodological Model of Populist Leadership 
The multi-methodological model presented in this conclusion provides the literature 
with a theoretical framework that draws upon multiple differing theories of populism, 
in an attempt to broaden the understanding of populism in relation to leaders, and 
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enable future scholarship to more comprehensively classify populist leaders. It is based 
on the evidence of this thesis, but is applicable to any New Zealand leader, and 
theoretically will produce outcomes that accurately classify any leader in the 
populist/heresthetics continuum. It improves on the current pre-eminent model, 
Gustafson’s framework, by incorporating it into a wider model that draws on the 
experience of international populist scholars, and also takes into account the strategic 
nature of some examples of popular leadership, and the balance of personal character 
inherent in each leader.  
The practical application of the multi-methodological model works as follows; firstly, a 
leader is selected, and the broad parameters of their career are established through 
background research. In the next stage, traditional populist theory and the theory of 
heresthetics is applied to the case study, in a search for empirical evidence that 
indicates a predilection for either of these cases. The first result is produced at this 
stage, and depending on the relative balance of traditional populist examples and 
heresthetic examples, a select path is chosen in the model, as indicated in the figure. 
Following this, Gustafson’s six criteria of populist leadership is applied, and the result 
will match the previous linkage in the first method section, as displayed in the figure of 
the model.   A strong correlation will match a high occurrence of traditional populism, a 
moderate correlation will follow after a balance between traditional populism and 
heresthetics, and weak or no correlation to the criteria will follow a high occurrence of 
successful heresthetics. Each of the four strands of the model will then produce a 
classification result, deeming the leader to be a pure populist, a mixed variant, a mild 
variant, or a pure heresthetician.  
Once the result is evident, Renshon’s foundations of character can be applied to the 
leader, in an attempt to find a qualitative explanation for their particular explanation. 
As the figure demonstrates, the similarity of the character integrity and relatedness 
stance of the pure populists contrasts with the Renshon application results of Seddon. 
It is hypothesised that similar cleavages will be present when other leaders are entered 
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into the model, which also are found to be of the mixed and mild variants, or pure 
heresthetician.  
Figure 7.2. Gustafson’s Framework Continuum and the Multi-Methodological 
Continuum 
 
A New Theoretical Tool – The Continuum of New Zealand Populist Leadership 
In addition to the multi-methodological model, the study provides two continuums to 
better visualise the placement of leaders on the populist spectrum. The first is a 
graphic illustration of the Gustafson model, in which leaders can be placed on a 
continuum that demonstrates the number of Gustafson’s criteria met by the case 
study. This is useful, both to give an appreciation of the relative scale of difference 
between each leader when only using this model to classify populism, and to contrast 
with the second continuum, which demonstrated the nuanced approach of the multi-
methodological model. After the application of the multi-methodological model to case 
study leaders, the leaders can be mapped on the second continuum. This visualises the 
differences between leaders, providing a scale that is easy to understand, and the 
change in placement on the continuum compared to the original Gustafson model 
demonstrates the added value, in terms of accuracy and a depth of understanding, of 
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using a broader array of theoretical tools to classify populist leaders. With the addition 
of more leaders to the multi-methodological model, more points on the continuum can 
be plotted, enabling the literature to see a wider view of the placement of historical 
leaders in New Zealand. 
Future Study 
Due to the creation of the multi-methodological model of populist leadership, many 
avenues of future study would be academically valuable. Firstly, more case studies are 
needed to thoroughly test the validity and rigidity of the model. The conclusions drawn 
from the model, in particular the classification system, would benefit from an 
expansion of case studies. The qualitative explanation of the leaders in this study, 
Renshon’s foundations of character, would also be aided by the application to more 
varied leaders. The general trends identified in the explanations of this study could be 
further tested by a comparative exercise of the character of other leaders. A further 
analysis of other notable populist leaders, particularly Muldoon, will not only test the 
model, and provide a deeper analysis of the mixed variant, of which it is theorised 
Muldoon would fit with Seddon, but will also provide a historical basis for the modern 
evolution of populist political leadership in New Zealand.  
The most fertile ground for future research in the area of populist leadership in New 
Zealand is the mild variant of populism, identified in the multi-methodological model. 
Anecdotal evidence, and brief excursions into analysis of other leaders careers, has led 
the writer to view this variant as crucial to the understanding of populism in New 
Zealand. The mild variant, balanced more towards heresthetics, but still possessing 
some populist approaches, is hypothesised to be the dominant variable of successful 
modern populism in New Zealand, particularly amongst Prime Ministers. Leaders such 
as John Key, Helen Clark and Keith Holyoake may fit this classification, and a thorough 
analysis of these leaders, through the multi-methodological model, will provide a more 
detailed understanding of the proposed mild variant to the literature. The mild variant 
is theoretical at this stage, due to the constraints of this study, but deep research into 
131 
 
such a variant will uncover nuanced details of modern populist leadership, particularly 
in the light of technological advancements in the field of political marketing, research 
and targeting. 
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